The Shia Armed Groups and Their Impact on Forming the Future of Iraq

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Abstract: In this article, we try to see the impact of the Shia militias in Iraq on forming the future of this country. We maintain that these armed groups will be a destabilizing factor for Iraq and its neighbors and they will worsen and deeper the sectarian division in the Middle East. We make an assessment for these different groups from the different perspectives. For example, in accordance with Ariel Ahram's model for the state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias and Weberian theory about the state as the only one entity that has violence monopoly.

Key words: Iraq · Shia armed groups · Sectarian division · ISIS and New Middle East

INTRODUCTION

In this paper we will introduce the political situation in Iraq since the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took over the second most populated city, Mosul, in Iraq in 2014. It is important to highlight that the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Shia militias on forming the future of Iraq and the peaceful coexistence in Iraqi society since ISIS defeated the Iraqi military in Mosul in July 2014.

Following the collapse of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the American and British forces faced multiple problems such as security issues, absences in the system and lack of fundamental services such as water and electricity. The White House decided to send their strong man Paul Bremer as their military representation and, as the leader of the collation in Iraq, his role was to create a new Iraqi regime based on the American point of view. The main idea of the Bremer's plan was to reform a new Iraq under the title "Ethnic Power Sharing". From this point on, Iraq has been divided into three main sects: Kurds, Sunni and Shia. The recreation process of the new Iraqi political system has resulted in the sectarianism of Iraqi society since 2003.

The first step in this direction started with the so-called Iraqi governing council (Majles Alhukem) as a replacement for Saddam Hussein's government. Majles Hukem consisted of representatives from the main Iraqi ethnic groups, with the intention of creating a roadmap for a new constitution and forming a new government. Ironically, many members of the Majles Hukm only returned to Iraq with the American and British forces and were unpopular among the majority of Iraqi society. Through Majls Hukm, Shia politicians could impose their conditions on the others. In the beginning, they were able to achieve an agreement with the Kurds regarding the senior positions in the Iraqi government. For example, the Shias should be given the prime minister's position because they were/are the majority, but the Kurds could receive the president's position. The division of the highly important positions between the two groups left the Sunnis feeling excluded from the political process. Therefore, the majority of the Sunnis chose to support the rebel groups against the collation force and the Iraqi government. The development of sectarianism in Iraqi society became the basis for the reconstruction of the state institutions and this had been reflected in all the state apparatus, For example, the new Iraqi military and its intelligence were the under control of the Shia and the country's foreign affairs were in the hands of the Kurds.

The turning point for Iraqi society was June 10, 2014 where ISIS took control over the second largest city in Iraq, Mosul. The Iraqi government lost the majority of its Sunni cities and population to ISIS. Moreover, the Iraqi military lost its willingness to fight in many the Sunni areas due to the population not considering the Shia soldiers to be a national army. The new phase of political turbulence and the expansion of violence started when

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the Iraqi army lost its morality to fight against ISIS fighters. This resulted in calling for the organizing of the Shia people in a so-called (Hashed Shabi) against ISIS.

Methods: The methodology of this research project is theoretical. This research will adopt a theory of violence devolution and a theory of state/government militias. This will enable the researcher to explore whether the Iraqi state is fighting against ISIS in accordance to the militias' values, given that this research investigates the Hashed Shabi as a destabilizing factor for Iraq and its neighbors. Following this, the conceptual framework of the research will be taken from the theory of state/government militias and the research questions will be designed theoretically:

1. Does the Iraqi state need militias to fight against terror?
2. What is the impact of religious militias as (Hashed Shabi in Iraq) on the future form of the state and society?
3. Will the Shia armed groups be a destabilizing factor for Iraq and its neighbors?

What Causes the Creation of Militias in the Middle East?: According to Max Weber, the state is the only entity which has monopoly of violence:

"Weberian concept of the state, which views the state as a monolithic entity and as the only beholder of the monopoly of violence[1]"

When the Iraqi state's establishments were unable to protect its internal and external security, then the existence of the militia is a natural process:

"...Weberian accounts of militias as constitutive of state failure[2]"

For example, consider Lebanon when it became classified as a failed state. Consequently, militias such as the Hezbollah act as a state and present themselves as an alternative to the state. In so doing, they took care of many issues such as providing jobs by investing their money in some small industries and offering free healthcare for poor people. The real cause for the existence of the militias in Middle Eastern societies is the states' weakness and lack of legitimacy. The example of Hezbollah would also be appropriate in the theory of violence decentralization. In the absence of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, it also results in the violence decentralization of the militia. The process of violence-decentralization in Iraq has already begun, as the Shia militia see themselves as a unit which has the state's legitimacy to exercise violence against the civilians in the areas they control.

Post - Saddam Era and the Shia (Revival) or (In Power): After the collapse of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the Americans decided to recreate a new regime on basis the so-called "Ethnic power sharing":

"Establishing a governmental system that can accommodate Iraq's different ethnic and religious groups, previously kept in check by the political and military repression of the Saddam[3]."

This meant that the Kurds, the Sunnis and the Shias should participate in ruling the country. The Iraqi governing council (IGC) which was established three months after the occupation of Bagdad, was based on the grounds of this principle. This consisted of 25 members and its ethnic and religious breakdown included 13 Shias, five Sunnis, five Kurds (also Sunnis), one Turkman and an Assyrian[4]. On June 1, 2004, the IGC dissolved after the creation of the new Iraq interim government (IIG) as a caretaker government to govern Iraq until the drafting of the new constitution. The Iraqi transitional government replaced the (IIG) on May 3, 2005 until May 20, 2006 and it arranged an election for choosing the national assembly on January 30, 2005 and this assembly drafted a permanent constitution which was then submitted for approval by the Iraqi people in a general referendum. The new constitution was approved and the Iraqi legislative authority was vested in two bodies: the Council of Representatives and the Council of Union. The post-Saddam period may be described as a rising of the Shia sect in Iraq and, at the same time, the exclusion of the Sunnis. The turning point for the Shia revival began with Said Ali Al-Sistani's (the most influential and famous Shia cleric) call for the Shias' active participation in the first

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[1]Balcells. (2012): P:406-411
[2]Sabine, Mitchell & Will Lowe, (2013). P: 4-5
[3]Brancati, 2004, P:7
[4]Evans, Gareth. "Only self-rule will bring stability to Iraq". The Crisis Group, 2003

parliamentary election in 2005. The majority of the Shia political parties put themselves into a block for participating in that election with the aim of getting as many seats as possible – which they succeeded[5]. Even the majority of the Iraqi transnational government were Shias and its prime minister was Ibrhim Jafary (Shia politician), though this did not mean a return to stability for Iraq. This was because the majority of the Sunnis felt excluded and were blamed for Saddam's brutal policy in Iraq and this pushed them to cooperate with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida to fight against both the Americans in Iraq and the Iraqi government. Iraqi society under Jafary's cabinet faced a terrible period and sectarian conflict was at a high level. The instability in Iraq continued until the unknown Shia politician (Nouri Al-Maliki) came into power. In an article published in Washington Post in 2014, Ali Khedery, an American Special Assistant to the US Ambassador and a Senior Adviser in Iraq (2003-2009), explained the process of choosing of Al-Maliki for the role as a replacement for Jafari. According to Khedery, Al-Maliki was unknown to the former American Ambassador (Zalmay Khalilzad) and to most Iraqi people but Khalilzad, after recommendations from Khedery and Jeffrey Beals, a former American diplomat, succeeded in garnering support among Iraqi leaders for giving Al-Maliki the position of prime minister[6]. On May 20, 2006 Al-Maliki became prime minister for Iraq and stayed in power until 2014. In the next part of this article, I will highlight the sectarian policy that was used by Al-Mailiki during his eight years as prime minister against the majority of Sunnis in cities such as Anbar, Salahadin, Tikrit and Mosul.

Al-Maliki Sectarian Policy as a Root for ISIS: Nouri Al-Maliki could, with the support from the US, Kurds, Sistani and Iran, return stability to the majority of Iraq. It was part of his political program that he would disarm Sunni and Shia militias in Baghdad, which he succeeded.

"Al-Maliki said Iraqi society must be cleansed of terrorism, the government must be rid of "administrative corruption" and factional militias must be disarmed. We must also address the issue of government centrality and the centrality of the armed forces and that weapons must only be in the hands of the government and the people must be disarmed," he said.

He said that "no militia in Iraq can share authority with the government's armed forces[7]"

During his first term (2006-2010), Prime Minister Al-Maliki centralized power into his hands and succeeded in the transformation of Iraq to single-party rule, with majority of Shias supporting his policy against the Sunnis. Finally, this resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis especially in Baghdad, for example:

" Baghdad went from some 45% Sunni in 2003 to only 25% Sunni by the end of 2007. Al-Maliki's sectarianism led to the transformation of Baghdad into a largely Shiite city[8]".

Shia monopoly made the police, military and court institutions corrupt. These institutions were kept only for candidates adhering to Shia principles and, especially during the Al-Maliki period, these candidates should also be loyal to his party. Consequently, Sunnis were excluded from these establishments. In the Sunni-dominated cities such as Al-Anbar, Al-Salahadin and Mosul, people considered the police and court institutions as a tool in the hands of Shias to eliminate them. This was the main cause of the dramatic seizure of power of these cities by ISIS and the Sunnis saw their chance to get rid of the Shia tyranny. At this point Iraq entered a new phase, where large parts of Sunni cities were under ISIS control and the police and army were powerless to fight back.

One of the most important tasks of the national state in its beginnings was protecting its internal and external security. The same idea exists in the new modern nation state:

"The differentiation between internal and external security and between police and military, has been a core principle of the modern nation-state[9]".

The internal security will be the police's responsibility but the external security is a task for the military. This does not, however, mean that the state should only protect its external security by its own military. Many countries today do not merely protect their external security with national military, but actually, they tend outsource it. The idea of outsourcing national security attracted democratic states like the USA and UK.

[5]Cockburn, Patrick. " Cricket but no chess in Sistani's vision for democratic Iraq". The Independent.co.uk, 2005. News World

[6]Khedery, Ali. "Why we stuck with Maliki - and lost Iraq" The Washington Post, July 03, 2014. Opinions

[7]Tures, J. "How We Enabled ISIS By Disarming Iraqi Militias". The Huffington Post. 2014.THE BLOG

[8]Cole, J. "Top 10 Mistakes of former Iraq PM Nouri al-Maliki (That Ruined his Country)". Juan Cole's Blog. 2014

[9]Lutterbeck, D. (2004). P: 45-46.

The US government made a contract with many private American military companies and security consulting firms such as Blackwater to provide security for their representatives in foreign countries[10].

Regarding to Iraq's internal and external security, it was difficult to see who was responsible for protecting the country's internal security because of the misuse of these institutions. Under the former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki both the police and army were controlled by his Shia party and the all top positions in defense system were directly affiliated to Al-Maliki.

John Kerry's plan for Iraq: After the unexpected collapse of the Iraqi military system in 2014, Sistani issued a fatwa for the Shia population to defend their city against ISIS. This Fatwa transformed Shia identity towards feeling more commitment to their sect than their nation and generated a renewed desire for revenge amongst them. Simultaneously, the Iranian regime welcomed Sistani's Fatwa, supplying the Iraqi government with intelligence and providing Hashed Shabi with training and new weapons. After the creation of Hashed Shabi, the Iraqi army's role changed from defending the country from any threat against its sovereignty to being a supporter and assistant for the Shia militia. In contrast to Sistani's Fatwa and to get Sunnis involved in the war against ISIS, the US foreign minister John Kerry came up with his new idea , the "National Guard" as part of the US plan for fighting against ISIS in Iraq:

"*.....On Wednesday, Mr. Kerry held a whirlwind series of meetings in Baghdad with Haider al-Abadi, the new Iraqi prime minister and other top Iraqi officials. Afterward, Mr. Kerry told reporters that Iraqi leaders had made sufficient political progress toward forming an inclusive government to warrant further cooperation with Iraq against ISIS, including efforts to help train Iraqi security forces. "We stand by Iraq as it continues to build a government that meets the needs of each of Iraq's diverse communities", Mr. Kerry said.*

Mr. Kerry hailed the Iraqis' decision to create new National Guard units that would be recruited locally and given the main responsibility for security in their home areas. "The United States is

prepared to provide technical advice and assistance in order to help the Iraqis move this very important initiative forward", Mr. Kerry said[11]".

The same idea/plan was used by Americans during 2006-2009 when they organized Sunni tribes in the Sunni-dominated cities under the so-called movement (*Al Sahawat*, Awakening Councils) to fight against *Al-Qaida*. In contrast to the *Al-Sahawat*, the National Guard should be an inclusive entity with representations from amongst all Iraqi ethnicities. The National Guard in Iraq was the US strategy to combat ISIS and then reconstruct Iraq's security sector.

The main goals with the National Guard were the following:

1. The National Guard should replace the Iraqi army institution and it should protect Iraq from sectarian division.
2. The Kurdish fighters (*Peshmerga*) should also integrate this time within the National Guard, because the *Peshmerga* were well-trained in comparison with Sunni and Shia fighters.
3. The integration of the Sunnis into the National Guard was one of most important goals, because, firstly the Sunnis didn't feel that they been allowed sufficient participation in the national army and institution was used by Nouri Al-Maliki over 2006-2014 to consolidate his power. Secondly, it would not give any excuse to ISIS when they claimed that they fight for the Sunnis rights and their future in Iraq.

"*US officials said al-Abadi had promised to create a national guard of local fighters to secure Iraq's 18 provinces – each run by a governor. That would ensure that the Iraqi army and it's mostly Shia force would not be in charge of security in Sunni regions. That would bring salaried jobs, government pensions and other benefits to areas of Iraq neglected during al-Maliki's eight years in power and which proved fertile breeding ground for Isis[12]".*

The Iraqi Parliament made a new law for the National Guard, though this has not yet been approved because of the impossibility of creating a broad agreement between different fractions. There are many critics about

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[10]Hamilton, S. "Outsourcing U.S. Defense: National Security Implications ". 2011. The National Defense
[11]Gordon, M. and Schmitt, E. "Saudi Arabia Will Grant U.S. Request for Anti-ISIS Training Program". The New York Times. 2014
[12]Tran, M. & Roberts, D. "Obama to lay out plan to 'destroy' Isis threat as Kerry arrives in Baghdad". World news, The Guardian. 2014

the National Guard because, on the one hand, it gives legal permission to create militia for each one of the Iraq's 18 provinces and, on the other, it would militarize the whole of Iraqi society.

The Criteria for Militias (Hashed - Alshabi The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a Militia): In this section, the so-called Hashed-Alshabi and the proposal for a National Guard is evaluated according to militia criteria.

"...it can describe anything between a dozen individuals armed with hunting rifles, to a force of millions equipped as well as a professional army[13]"

The above definition is one of the broadest explanations of the militia and, to some extent, it is difficult to identify Hashed Al-shabi through it. Therefore, I think it is necessary to have another and more limited definition of militia. In order to have an academic approach, Saeid Golkar's identification is used[14]:

1. Maintaining local defense.
2. Upholding law and order.
3. Violating human right and foster insecurity.
4. Controlling security in weak states.
5. Their members are recruited from local communities.

The Shia militias can be identified through all these criteria. Actually, after the sudden collapse of Iraqi security in 2014, many cities of Iraq were in need of protection. This is why young men with access to guns organized themselves and took control over their community. The militias in Iraq did not only protect their cities but they also began to attack other cities in revenge. For example, Shia groups such as the League of the Righteous, after they conquered the city of Tikrit, began to loot and kill the survivors. In addition, it is crucial to categorize these Iraqi militias in order to reveal to which type they belong. According to Ariel Ahram's book (Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias[15]), there are five types of militia and they have deep impact on the peaceful coexistence of society:

Militia Types
Quasi-Official Militias
State-Sponsored Militias
Paramilitaries
Warlords
Pro-Government Militias[16]

The Shia militias in Iraq can be seen as pro-government. This is because the following groups such as Bader, League of the Righteous, Hezbollah in Iraq and Sadr were already financed by the central government in Bagdad, show their loyalty to the central government and coordinate their actions with the government. The coordination with the Iraqi government came about following the push from the US, as the leader of coalition forces against ISIS in Iraq. The coalition forces were concerned about the Shia militias' activities in the Sunni area and their behavior towards the Sunni population. Beside this, the US showed their concern with the Iranian involvement and their influence on these militias.

Finally, this argument can underline that the following groups (Bader, League of the Righteous, Hezbollah in Iraq, Sadr) could be identifying as pro-government with reference to the below classification according to Sabine Carey, Neil Mitchell and Will Lowe:

1. is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or sub-national).
2. is identified as not being part of the regular security forces.
3. is armed.
4. has some level of organization[17]".

The Iraqi State as a Hybrid State: According to many political scientists, such as Joakim Ekman, Jean-François Gagné and Leonardo Morlino, the phenomenon of the hybrid state is a situation where the state is trapped between two structures: one is non-democratic framework and the second is democratic[18]. The state's institutions have difficulty in adopting democratic behavior because of their authoritarian background. The legitimacy of the state is not wholly lacking, rather it is acquired and exploited in dubious way and often remains contested[19].

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[13]Hawn, J. "Intro to Global Security: Defining Mercenaries and Militias". Jeff Hawn's Blog

[14]Golkar. (2015) P: 5-10

[15]Balcells. (2012) P: 405-409

[16]Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013. P: 4-6

[17]Ibid. (2013): 5-6

[18]Morlino. (2009). P: 273-296.

[19]Hague, R. & Harrop, M. (2010). P 83-99.

This is one of the most important causes of the creation of the militias in many Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Yemen. According to Joakim Ekman, states that fit the hybrid regime profile can be identified based on the following characteristics[20]:

1. Elections which are not too flawed and which have the potential to make a difference;
2. Significant levels of corruption, particularly in the judicial and electoral arenas;
3. A lack of vital components of democratic quality, such as checks and balances and government accountability;
4. A problematic press freedom situation, typically including incumbents' desire to control the media, particularly television;
5. A poor civil liberties situation, including limits on freedom of expression and the freedom to form organizations and trade unions; and
6. A problematic rule of law situation, including a lack of judicial independence.

In addition, Amin Massoud, a Tunisian researcher, emphasizes four components that result in a hybrid state[21]:

1. The militias replace the military system.
2. Central government consists of sectarian cantons.
3. Legislative system is more than customary laws and less than constitutional provisions.

4. Political class (in power and the opposition alike) more than the advocates of communities and less than a modern state builders and owners of institutional reform projects.

Iraq has transformed into being a hybrid state because of the dominance of the central government in Bagdad by the Shias' party. This means that the majority of Sunnis and Kurds did not see the central government as a cohesive national government and many parts of this government's institutions such as the police, courts and the military lack legitimacy. When citizens lose their trust in the integrity of the state institutions, they try to find alternatives. The Kurds have their own almost independent state and they do not have strong ties to Baghdad. The Sunnis had already organized their tribal committee which worked as micro-government in their areas before ISIS appeared in Mosul and Al-Anbar. The process of the division of Iraq is as likely to happen as much today as it has in past. The catalyst behind this process is the Shia militias that fight against ISIS. These militias have legitimate rights to use force against whom they identify as Sunni, or at least the Sunni majority. In the following section, the focus will be on the criteria for creating militia and make an evaluation of the Shias militia as a threat for a peaceful coexistence.

The War for Geographical Expansion: According to an article from the Al-Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies located in Amman, Jordan, there are around 67 Shia armed groups and they operate in the different regions inside Iraq and in Syria. Each has its own name, leader, territory and religious Marja (authority):

Table 1: Factions of The People's Mobilization Forces in Iraq and Syria [22]

T	The name	Leader	Working Yard	Religious Marja (authority)
1	Saraya Al-salam / Sadrist	Kazem Hussein Al-Issawi	Iraq / Samarra sector - Qayyarah	Iraq: Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
2	Badr-Corps-military wing the Badr Organization	Hadi al-Ameri	Iraq - Salahuddin sector, Diyala, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
3	Kata'ib Iraqi Hezbollah –	Jaafar al-Ghanemi	Iraq - Sector of Anbar, Salah al-Din / Nukhayib	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
4	Asa'ib Ahl- Haq	Qais al-Khazali	Iraq - Sector of Salah al-Din / Nukhayib, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
5	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada	Hashim Banyan ul-Awliya: Abu Alaa "	Iraq - Sector Baghdad belt, Salah al-Din	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
6	Kata'ib Hezbollah Al- Nujaba	Akram Abbas, al-Kaabi	Iraq - Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.

For the rest of the figure, please see the supplement pages.

As we can see from the figure above, these Iraqi Shia militias have been used in the regional conflict and are now fighting to gain as much territory as possible. For example, groups such as the League of Righteous People

(Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq) also known as the Khazali network, have their field of operation in the city of (DUZ) where the majority consist of Kurds (Sunnis) and a minority of Turkmen (Shia). This group has been involved in heavy

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[20]Ekman, J. (2009). P:7-31

[21]عن 'الدول الهجينة' في العالم العربي - أمين بن مسعود 2015 - عن 'الدول الهجينة' في العالم العربي بقلم:أمين بن مسعود

http://www.alarab.co.uk/m/?id=53177

[22]The Rawabet Research and Strategic Studies Center. "Popular Crowd Forces in Iraq (Al-Hashd al-shaabi) Origin and Future - survey" Releases, The Rawabet. 2016

fighting against the Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) and many from both sides have been killed. The presence of the Khazali group in DUZ was not to fight against ISIS, because the city was protected by Peshmerga and ISIS were not present there. Instead, the overall aim of the Khazali group was (and still is) to dominate more areas. Their different fields of operation provide significant evidence for their struggles for more land and more control. Another aspect of these groups is that the majority of them have the current Iranian supreme leader and Muslim cleric Ayatollah Khamenei as their religious authority, which it results in that they are unconditionally loyal to him. In other words, they are part of the Iranian policy in the Middle East and they are now part of the proxy war in the region[23]. They have been backed by external regimes such as Iran, which means they are directly under the influence of Iranian policies and they will be working in favor of Iran's betterment. Finally, the Shia fighters have been part of the war in Syria and some of them have been killed. The intervention in the Syria conflict of the Shiite militias is considered to be the most dangerous transformation. This transformation process is going from being local militias to being a regional militias and finally as mercenaries, which means they can be used in any conflict in the Islamic world such as in Syria, Yemen and, most probably, in Bahrain.

CONCLUSION

Finally, it is important to underline that the Shia in Iraq are using a sectarian policy in order to gain control. As I mentioned in the beginning of this research, the sectarian policy by Shia politicians has been supported by the majority of the Shia and by religious clerics such as Al-Sistani. This policy is believed to be the root of the creation of ISIS in the Sunni cities and this is why the Sunni supported ISIS against the central government in Bagdad. The future of Iraq is still unclear and the political process is moving in the direction that a division into three parts will be one of the best options. The Shia political parties are not willing to share power with the Sunnis and Kurds and they still insist on their unconditional right to rule as they want. The Iraqi population is facing two choices, one is around 40% of Iraq's territory controlled by ISIS and the second is the existence of Shia militias. The concept and feeling of a unified national government has almost vanished. The Shia militias are now acting as the legitimate institution

and their capability to run government is limited because of the lack of legitimacy. However, after the defeat of ISIS by the people's mobilization force in Mosul and the control of this city, these Shia armed groups will not accept any power that try to push them out of the Iraqi political system. According to al-monitor, a series of secret meetings have been held between the people's mobilization force's representative and a diplomatic delegation from the West in order to better understand these armed groups and their plan for the future of Iraq[24]. They have already started reorganizing themselves into a political party with the aim of participating in the next election, which will be in 2018.

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T	The name	Leader	Working Yard	Religious Marja (authority)
1	Saraya Al-salam / Sadrist	Kazem Hussein Al-Issawi	Iraq / Samarra sector- Qayyarah	Iraq: Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
2	Badr-Corps-military wing the Badr Organization	Hadi al-Ameri	Iraq- Salahuddin sector, Diyala, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
3	Kata'ib Iraqi Hezbollah –	Jaafar al-Ghanemi	Iraq-Sector of Anbar, Salah al-Din / Nukhayib	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
4	Asa'ib Ahl- Haq	Qais al-Khazali	Iraq-Sector of Salah al-Din / Nukhayib, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
5	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada	Hashim Banyan ul-Awliya: Abu Alaa "	Iraq-Sector Baghdad belt, Salah al-Din	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
6	Kata'ib Hezbollah Al- Nujaba	Akram Abbas, al-Kaabi	Iraq-Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
7	Kata'b Imam Ali	Shibil Zaidi	Iraq-Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
8	Kata'b Jund al-Imam	Ahmed al-Asadi "Abu Jaafar al-Asadi"	Iraq-Sectorof Anbar and Salahuddin.	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
9	Saraya al-Khorasani	Ali al-Yassiri	Iraq- sector of belt and center of Baghdad	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
10	Liwa Abu Fadhal Al-Abbas	Aws al-Khafaji	Iraq-belt of Baghdad, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
11	Saraya Aljhad- Supreme Islamic Council	Hassan Radhi al-sarees	Iraq-Anbar	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
12	Ansar al-Aqeeda Islamic Higher Council	Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir	Iraq-Anbar	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
13	Saraya Ansar al-Ashura – the Islamic Supreme Council	Kadhim al-Jabri, "Abu Ahmed al-Jabri"	Iraq-Nukhayib	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
14	Kata'b al-Tayyar of Al-Risali	Adnan Ormad al-shahmani	Iraq and Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
15	Al-Abbas Fighting Division	Maitham al-Zaidi	Iraq-Nukhayib	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
16	Kata'ib alshaheed al-Awal- Dawa Party-Iraq Organization – Hashim al-Musawi	Wathiq al- Fartusi	Iraq-Alnikhyeebis	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
17	Kata'bal-shaheed al- Sadr Awal –Dawa party-Iraq Organization Hashim al-Musawi	Gen. Abid al-Karim Al-Gazan	Iraq-Samarra	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
18	Kata'b of elite and Ghaith Alhaidara- Dawa Party Home Organization Abdelkarim Anzi	Manaf al-Husseini	Iraq-Anbar	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
19	Liwa Ali al- Akbar Islamic Action Organization	Ali al-Hamdani	Iraq-Nukhayib	Iran: Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi
20	Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali	Maitham Al-allaq	Iraq-Karbala	Iraq: Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Yacoubi
21	Kata'b Ansar al-Marja'yya	Hamid al-Yassiri	Iraq-Samarra	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
22	Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib	Suhail al-Araji	Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
23	Jaysh al-Mukhtar	Wathiq Al- Battat	Iraq-Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
24	Faylaq al-Wa'ad al-Sadiq	Ammar al-Haddad	Iraq and Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
25	Kata'ib Ansar al-Hijja	Mohammad Kanani	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
26	Kata'ib Qamar Bani Hashim	Abu Talib Mayahi	Iraq Anbar	Iraq: Ayatollah Kamal al-Haidari
27	Hezbollah Tha'irun	Rehman Al-jazaeri	Iraq Baghdad belt	Lebanon: Hassan Nasrallah, Mohammed Alcauthrana
28	Kata'b Imad Mughniyeh, Iraqi Hezbollah-Kata'bs	Saad al-Fatlawi, "Abu Khaled"	Iraq Anbar	Lebanon: Nasrallah
29	Brigade of Qasim Al-jabareen	Mohammed al-Musawi	Iraq-Nukhayib	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
30	Liwa al-Imam al-Qa'im	Talib Alaleaoa	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
31	Kata'ib A'imat al-Baqi	Jihad al-Tamimi	Iraq	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
32	Ansar Allah al-Awfiya	Haider Ghraoui	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
33	Liwa al-Munta'ar	Dagher al-Moussawi	Iraq Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
34	Kata'ib thar ullah	Walid al-Hilli	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
35	Kata'ib al-Qasas	Abdullah al-Lami	Iraq-Samarra	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
36	Kata'b Ashbal Al- Sadr	Mohammed Hussein al-Sadr	Iraq-Samarra	Iran: Kazem al-Haeri
37	Kata'ib Thaer al-Hussein	Ghassan Shahbandar	Iraq-Nukhayib	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
38	Kata'ib Malik Ashtar	Jafar Abbas al-Musawi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
39	Kata'ib Al-Dem Al-Zakeya	Mu'ayyad Ali Hakim	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
40	Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar	Hussein al-Tamimi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
41	Harakat al-Abdal	Jaafar al-Moussawi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
42	Kata'ib Muslim bin Aqeel	Ahmed Fartusi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
43	Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi	Naji Hilfi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
44	Liwa al-Mu'ammal	Saad Swar	Iraq	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
45	Kata'ib al-Adalah(justice)	Samir Sheikh Ali	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
46	KatA'ib Al-Fatih (Conquest Brigades)	Kazim Ali	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
47	KatA'ib Saraya al-Zahra	Mumtaz Al-Haidari	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
48	Islamic Army in Iraq	Jamal Al-Wakeel	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi
49	Kata'ib Al-Ataba Al-Husayniya	Abd Mahdi Karbalai	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei

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Factions of The People's Mobilization Forces in Iraq

T	The name	Leader	Working Yard	Religious Marja (authority)
50	Kata'ib al-Aqila Zainab	Hassan Alshakrgi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
51	Liwa al-Al- Tuff	Mustafa al-Musawi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
52	Kata'ib Al-Imam al-Galib	Mohammed al-Lami	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
53	Kata'ib Al- Imam Al-Hussein	Hassan al-Rubaie	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
54	Kata'ib Al- Husseini Al-qiam	Mohammad Khafaji	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
55	Kata'ib Dir' al-wilaya	Alaa sleazy	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
56	Kataib Al-Qariah	Ahmed Zamili	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
57	Kata'ib Yed Allah (Hand of God)	Ahmed al-Saadi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
58	Kata'ib Bqiyat Allah (	Mustafa al-Obeidi	Iraq-Baghdad belt *	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
59	Kata'ib al-Shabab al-Islami	Mostafavi Musawi	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
60	Kata'ib Ahl Al-Bayt	Musa al-Hassani	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
61	Saraya PDF	Mezher al-Khafaji	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
62	Kataib alttifl Al-radie	Wissam al-Haidari	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Kamal al-Haidari
63	Kata'ib Mukhtar Althagafi	Mahdi Karbalai	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
64	Saraya Al-Sajad	Mahdi Karbalai	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
65	Kata'ib waad ullah	Sami al-Masoudi, deputy of the head of the Shiite Waqf	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
66	Kata'ib al-Ghawth al-Adham	Firas Al-Allaq	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
67	Kata'ib of Babylon	Ryan Chaldean	Iraq-Baghdad belt	Christian movement