

## The Nexus Between Indian Intervention and Factors in Pakistan Conflict: A Critical Analysis

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**Abstract:** This study examines the nexus between intervention and the factors responsible for Pakistan conflicts: an in-depth analysis. It analyzes the Patterns of Partition and Conflict in the Pakistan, Pakistan's geo-strategic position after partition from India, militancy and the manner it roles affects the potential long-term political instability in the country. Islamic jihad influence in Pakistan and the state's relationship with Islamist groups and parties. The author argues that Pakistan's political instability today is in large measure due to the struggle between three major actors the civilian wing of the state, the military and the Islamists. Partition from British India and the migration that followed led to mobilization based on identity, a power structure that was eventually dominated by the military and the weakening of democratic institutions and principles. Partition also led to an imbalance of power between Pakistan and India, which continues to shape internal Pakistani politics.

**Key words:** Indian • Pakistani • Conflict • Jihad

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### INTRODUCTION

In Pakistan conflicts, three actors: the civilian wing of the state, the military and Islamic parties and groups were struggling for influence and power. The military establishment has emerged as the parallel government of the state because of its influence over the state's policies and priorities. This institutional imbalance between the civilian and military wings of the state has led the former to capitulate to the latter in matters of policy and strategy, including Pakistan's involvement in the war on terror [1].

Additionally, the Indo-Pakistan conflict has increased the security apparatus's dominance over the civilian administration. Islamic parties and groups have also become important political actors by seeking to define the national agenda, set moral standards for the political elite and influence the state to establish sharia, or Islamic law. From partition onwards, the ulema, or Islamic theologians; increasingly appropriated public space and over the course of half a century, assumed the role of an Islamic establishment. This establishment and the militancy that has become associated with it now challenge the legitimacy and authority of the state [2].

This internal struggle in Pakistan has its roots in the power play among contending forces that emerged on the

political stage after independence. Partition led to political developments that favoured ideological mobilization, the militarization of the power structure and a national vision based on security. The initially dominant migrant leadership of the state shied away from a pluralist framework of authority. While Islamic ideology had been operative before partition, Islamic militancy only emerged during the wars in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Sectarian conflict was fuelled by the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia after the Khomeini Revolution in 1979. In addition to these factors, the militarization of politics is partly due to the imbalance of power between Pakistan and India and partly to U.S. influence, especially during the three periods (1950s/60s, 1980s and 2000s) when the U.S.-Pakistan strategic alliance was strong [1].

Whereas many analysts explain the situation in Pakistan in simple terms with a focus on the state of Pakistan and depict a doomsday scenario, this paper attempts to analyze the Patterns of Partition and Conflict in the Pakistan, Pakistan's geo-strategic position after partition from India, militancy and the manner it roles affects the potential long-term political instability in the country. Finally the state of Islamic Jihad influence in the country and the state's relationship with Islamist groups and parties.

**Patterns of Partition and Conflict in Pakistan:** After partition, India became a successor state of British India while Pakistan became a seceding state. Despite the ostensible separation, their intermingled histories, cultures and demographics not to mention the geographic dispute over Kashmir have prolonged an intractable conflict. The geographic partition of the sub-continent led to a persistent Pakistani emphasis on partitioning itself further from India in social, cultural and religious terms. Pakistan's state-building project was dominated by a determination to demonstrate that the newly-founded country was decidedly not India. While Indian nationalism was rooted in the idea of India, Muslim nationalism in Pakistan and elsewhere was rooted in the "two-nation theory" based on the notion that religion rather than territory or ethnicity, determined identity.

Partition created several anomalies for Pakistan. The new state comprised two noncontiguous areas, Fifty-five percent of the population of the new state, East Bengal, dominated the forty five percent remaining in the four provinces of West Pakistan, creating a "one-province coming from peripheral areas of British India now included in Pakistan. However, those of migrant stock represent 20 percent of the population in Pakistan today. Every fifth household in Pakistan, every fourth in Punjab and Sindh provinces and more than half in Karachi are "migrant." A new ethnic hierarchy emerged with Urdu-speaking migrants, or the mohajirs, on top followed by Punjabis both migrants and locals with Bengalis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis and the Baloch at the bottom. Over represented in cities and in the professional and commercial middle classes in Punjab and Sindh, migrants exercised a disproportionately high level of influence on the developing state and society. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first governor-general (1947-1948) and Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister (1947-1951), were both migrants.

The migrant leadership, with its constituency back in India, soon realized that elections would be disruptive for the new ruling set-up. These new elite created a bureaucratic polity that emphasized the rule of law rather than the rule of public representatives, a phenomenon that persisted through the time of the military rulers. Stemming from the tradition of the viceroys in British India, power gravitated in Pakistan into the hands of the governor- general and then the president [2].

Constitutionalism was tempered by institutionalism and undercut by the doctrine of "state necessity." A power struggle emerged between the state apparatus, represented by the middle class and the landed and tribal elite, which came to constitute the "political class." [3].

The migrant-leader and military leadership privileged the middle class at the expense of the political class. Composed mostly of Punjabis and the Mohajirs, the middle class represents the educated, professional and commercial interests in the modern dominated by Sunni Majoritarian nationalism, eventually leading to sectarian strife. There were incessant calls to declare other communities including Ahmadis, Shias, Ismailis and Zikris as outsiders to Islam.

Partition also helped militarize Pakistan, Two- thirds of Punjab province, which had accounted for half of the army in British India and Rawalpindi division (an administrative unit between the provincial and district levels) that was the hub of military recruitment inside the province, became part of Pakistan. Because of its capacity as a military province, Punjab became the centre of the new state as the supreme power broker [4].

Partition created a permanent imbalance of power between India and Pakistan that only worsened after 1971. Not surprisingly, Pakistan cultivated an "equalizer" in the U.S., a regional balancer in China, an anchor in the Organization of Islamic Countries (QIC) and a doctrine of strategic depth in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The partition led to enormous difficulties in constitution-making for the federation and further partition of the state in 1971 did not solve the one-province-dominates all situation, because even within the new Pakistan, Punjab alone accounted for 58 percent of the population. This made administrating the federation even more unwieldy [5].

Partition changed the position of Muslims from a minority to a majority in Pakistan, making Sunnis an absolute majority (approximately 80 percent) of the Pakistani population. Thereby making religion as a political organizing principle and public policy decisions were based on religious considerations.

#### **Pakistan's Geo-Strategic Position after Partition:**

Pakistan's internal dynamics and national security concerns are affected by the geo-strategic position and most notably the strained relations between Islamabad and Delhi. From Kashmir's controversial accession in 1947, the 1971 fall of Dhaka and the 1984 occupation of Siachin Glacier to the building of Baghliar Dam allegedly leading to Delhi's control of the water supply to Pakistan as the lower riparian country Pakistan has perceived India as an expansionist power [5]. Pakistan has also been concerned about India's ambitious arms build-up program, its penetration into Afghanistan through infrastructure projects and the alleged use of its consulates to support insurgents in Balochistan [6].

India has established good relations with the Northern Alliance, the mainstay of Hamid Karzai's ruling outfit. India seeks to penetrate Central Asia through Afghanistan and has managed to include the latter in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Delhi also wants to constrain Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan by ensuring that a Taliban takeover of Kabul does not happen again. According to [7], India's strategy toward Central Asia via Afghanistan, Washington and Islamabad, but also between state and society and between Islamists and modernists in the country.

In the 1990s, Washington and Islamabad's policies and strategies were no longer aligned as they had been in the previous decade. Growing anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world along with an Islamic perspective that came to be viewed as an alternative after the Afghan resistance movement in the 1980s and was in part unwittingly facilitated by the United States led to a growing divide between state and civil institutions in Muslim countries. In Pakistan, the desire to remain in power kept the ruling elite, including former president Musharraf, firmly allied with the U.S. While the rulers were on the right side of the American "with-us-or- against-us" formulation, they were viewed unfavourably by many in their own country for this stance.

Despite this alliance between Islamabad and Washington, Pakistan's relationship with the U.S. was strained after the events of 9/11, in part because of confusion and mistrust between the two sides. Many Pakistanis came to believe that the war on terror was imposed on Pakistan by the Americans, while many in the U.S. questioned Islamabad's sincerity in its commitment to fighting terror. In particular, Washington has not trusted Pakistan's security apparatus, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), because of its alleged support of the Taliban by providing weapons, ammunition, intelligence and even direction to suicide bombings. The strategic community in Washington has also expressed disappointment with the level and quality of support from Pakistan and has raised concerns about the latter's potential for survival as a functioning state influence in Afghanistan [8].

Pakistan is also concerned about how the other regional actors China, Russia, India and Iran will react after U.S. leaves Afghanistan. Pakistan worries that its own interests will be sidelined in any forthcoming exit strategy. Pakistan has continued to engage in the war effort in Afghanistan in order to assert itself among regional powers. This strategy, however, has come at the cost of its internal security needs namely dealing with the

Pakistani Taliban and its allies and has led to a diplomatic dilemma internationally. Afghanistan faces the Herculean task of state building in its ethnically fragmented society and as a weak state among strong regional powers. This challenge leads to an argument in favour of a regional understanding and recognition of Pakistan as a legitimate stakeholder in the Afghanistan effort, especially because of its geographic proximity and Pakhtun connection.

#### **Militancy and the Manner for which it Roles Affects the Potential Long-Term Political Instability in the Country:**

The emergence of Islamic parties and the increase in militancy have affected the internal power struggle in Pakistan. The first generation of Islamic intellectuals in the country seriously took up the task of defining, conceptualizing and operationalizing Islamic agency, seeking to crystallize the classic notions of statehood as operative in the early days of Islam. Led by the celebrated Islamic scholar Syed Abul A'ala Maudoodi, Islamic models of public life increasingly shaped an alternative discourse from the 1950s onward.

The religious lobby sought influence through the ballot in the 1970s and the bullet in the 1980s against the backdrop of the Afghanistan jihad. While Maudoodi and his party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) did not succeed at the ballot box, his ideas acquired widespread currency [2], [9] observed that 'education became a major vehicle of the new Islamism, much as in Egypt under the influence of Syed Qutb, Maudoodi's Arab counterpart. Both called for jihad and initiated a cultural civil war through modern educational institutions. The proliferation of madrasahs, or Islamic seminaries, was most common in the Pakhtun areas, representing "a massive experiment in social engineering in northern Pakistan," and spread to Punjab and Karachi. The estimated sixteen thousand madrasahs (with approximately 1.5 million students) provide, for many, an alternative to the perceived Western-dominated educational system of Pakistan, [10]. Analysts have speculated about the potential of madrasahs to radicalize politics in Pakistan. A recent study has argued that the reality is that a large number of madrasah students come from the lowest stratum of society, religious philanthropists open madrasahs and provide free food and accommodation and madrasahs indoctrinate a dichotomous worldview, stoke sectarian conflict and attempt to govern gender relations, producing a combative mind among students. As noted in a United States Institute of Peace survey on Pakistan, recruitment to jihadi organization's comes from religious gatherings in and outside the mosque (44 percent), social network of family and friends (42 percent) and madrasahs and

schools (26 percent). (Christine C.F., 2008). Jihadi training goes beyond carrying out jihad, suicide bombing or attacks on rival sects; it also includes wider proselytizing efforts to promote jihadism.

The militarization of madrasahs is a worrying trend, especially in areas bordering Afghanistan. Madrasahs, with their own social service systems, extreme insularity and sense of a transcendental mission, operate as parallel institutions and potential platforms for mobilization against the state. The prevalence of this Islamic militant progression in the country like Taliban was characterized by the Pakistan Army's support. Taliban was used as pro-Pakistan group in Afghanistan and the army's use of the militant group to dismantle the post-Mohammad Najibullah presidency (1987-1992] in Kabul during the mid-1990s. The rise of the Taliban and their rule in Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001 was the product of Pakistani backing, support from Afghanistan's Pakhtun community and the war induced displacement, anarchy and militancy that became a way of life. Islamic parties, conservative sections of the middle class and some politicians, including the Oxford educated Imran Khan, viewed the rule of the Taliban in Kabul as a symbol of Islamic justice, political stability and the realization of the vision to establish sharia.

In 2007 military action against the radical elements operating from within Jamia Hafsa, a madrasah for female students housed in the Red Mosque in Islamabad, started a new wave of bomb attacks at the hands of proto-Taliban jihadi groups, who had already been active for more than a decade. These proto-Taliban groups include: Haqqani group: Based in North Waziristan, along with outfits of Mullah International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA" Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the Haqqani group mainly attacks NATO targets in Afghanistan [11].

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkatul Jihad and Harkatul Mujahideen: These groups have focused on Indian targets since the days of the 1990 Kashmir jihad. LeT was implicated in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Based in FATA, TTP is a string of loosely tied jihadi groups that operates all over the country and attacks Pakistani targets. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ): Headquartered in Jhang in South Punjab, SSP is a major sectarian militant outfit. Both SSP and LJ tend to carry out attacks against Shias.

One study describes the presence of more than five thousand militants from various jihadi organizations in the city. Police have routinely arrested foreign residents of Afghan and Central Asian origin, with links to terrorist

networks. Taliban activists have been fleeing FATA under the deadly impact of U.S. drone attacks and Karachi is emerging as a safe haven for them.

**Islamic Jihadi Influence in Pakistan and the State's Relationship with Islamist Groups and Parties:** The army has cultivated, mobilized and mainstreamed Islamic forces in the country. Although Ayub Khan found the ulema a relic of the past and a hindrance to the nation's progress, his successor, Yahya Khan, faced the rise of Bengali nationalism and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's populist movement on the eve of the 1970 elections. The army, since then, has sought to cultivate Islamic parties as a bulwark against the groundswell of popular feelings towards the ruling elite. The army and Islamic parties cooperated with each other in the military operation in East Pakistan in 1971, the Islamization program under Zia-ul-Haq, the Afghanistan jihad (1980s), the victory of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) an alliance of Islamic parties in the 2002 elections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the passage of the 17th amendment, which subjected the parliament to dissolution [12].

Pakistan's Islamic laws emerged not from public demand sponsored and championed by the mainstream parties in the parliament, but from martial law. Zia-ul-Haq made the 1949 Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the 1973 Constitution, obligating the state to incorporate Islamic provisions into law. After cases accusing women of adultery and the killing of several members of minority groups for allegedly desecrating the prophet and his companions, several governments have tried to reform the Hudood Ordinance (a sharia-enforcing law enacted by Zia-ul-Haq) and the controversial Blasphemy Law. The Islamic establishment has fiercely opposed any change in these laws and thus gradually assumed political agency in its own right.

The state's general ambiguity toward Islamic organizations has had negative effects. Keeping jihadi organizations alive has destabilized the country and the perception that they are strategic assets against India is unsubstantiated. [13] argued that various governments from Zia-ul-Haq onwards have been remarkably tolerant of jihadi mosques and madrasahs and the radicalism associated with them. Consequently, the government has been unable to control militant discourse and activity, with the sole exception of the 2007 Red Mosque incident. Further complicating the government's calculus in dealing with and rooting out jihadi organizations has been the fact that almost a parallel government are run in FATA, the Taliban levy taxes, get protection money, collect revenue based on a "tax schedule," extort commission from

contractors engaged in local projects and impose heavy fines for crimes such as robbery. The Taliban have also been engaged in bank robberies outside their areas of "governance," especially in Karachi.

The state's inability to control militant activities underscores the importance of political modernization as a key component of any reform effort in Pakistan. The difference between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces (previously referred to as the North-West Frontier Province) and FATA illustrates this point. The two adjacent regions share ethnic, linguistic and cultural characteristics, yet their political systems have developed in opposite directions. Whereas political participation in FATA was based on violence and intimidation, it revolved around the ballot box in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In 2002, MMA the coalition of Islamic parties won a majority of seats in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's provincial elections, in the wake of the U.S. campaign against the Taliban and allegedly with the indirect support of the Musharraf government (because the latter wanted to keep contending mainstream and ethnic parties out of power). Hassan A. (2010) further argued that for the government to maintain that co-opting the mullahs was better than having them on the outside. MMA Islamized the public education system suppressed women's rights (including the denial of access to male doctors) and passed the "Hisba Bill," was an attempt at enacting sharia.

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)'s agenda caused speculation that the Taliban's attempt to establish sharia in the rest of the country would soon materialize. In 2008, however, the Awami National Party (ANP), a liberal party, won provincial elections. The party soon came under pressure from various Taliban groups whose anchor in mainstream politics, MMA, had been discredited and voted out. After terrorist attacks killed several ANP members, the provincial government entered into peace agreements with the Taliban, thinking that if it cannot fight them, it should make a deal with them. Despite the Taliban's intimidation, political modernization has allowed for the integration of the province into the mainstream legal and political system rather than being administered under a traditional system of justice and administration.

## CONCLUSION

The internal conflict between the three main actors in Pakistan (the civilian wing of the state, the military and Islamic parties and groups) has caused the country to face political instability at home and a diplomatic and strategic crisis abroad. The effects of partition, migration, military rule, Islamic militancy and regional instability have

all contributed to the country's instability. Contending forces whether driven by religious, sectarian, ethnic, tribal and linguistic identities or by civilian-military and modernist-Islamist struggles can adversely affect the authority of the state in the long term.

Despite its history of military rule and regional instability that exacerbate internal political conflict, the state in Pakistan has a long history of legal and institutional development. Pakistan is not a "generic" Muslim state, but rather a constitutional state akin to India. Its authority is based on the Westminster model, characterized by legitimacy based on popular mandate, an elaborate judicial system, the prevalence of political parties, but it also has primordial loyalties of tribe and caste, the use and abuse of religion in electoral campaigns, based on ethno-linguistic divides. Various civil society actors in Pakistan have been vocal proponents of the rule of law and of curbing jihadi propaganda and the perceived appeasement of the Taliban and proto-Taliban groups.

While civil society in the West has been more concerned about the illiberal legal constraints on people's freedoms and their governments' overreach in the war on terror, civil society in Pakistan has challenged the government's 'Insincerity in controlling the menace of Talibanization in the country. Therefore political modernization emerges as the most crucial variable for producing political stability and social harmony within a pluralist framework of policy and practice. Several recommendations are made below.

**Recommendations:** Pakistan government felt helpless in its inability to control security matters especially as Islamic militancy and the political ascendancy of proto-Taliban groups only become stronger in the absence of political modernization and good governance. Therefore, Pakistan must:

- Strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions especially the court system, in order to deliver justice, handle citizens' complaints and enhance political participation.
- Modernization of Political system, by strengthening political institutions that can enhance regular elections and providing incentives for national parties' to move out from ethnic identity and religious politics.
- A genuine effort should be made to curb increasing threat of terrorism and spread of militancy beyond FATA, Swat and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa into Punjab and Karachi, by strengthening counterterrorist operations.

- Diplomatic efforts must be advanced to resolve various regional conflicts, especially between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan to establish viable, long-term peaceful diplomatic relations which could secure regional stability.
- Create and implement a comprehensive reform program to Promote intellectual discourse based on the rejection of violence as a legitimate means of conflict resolution.

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