# Construction of New S-box using a Linear Fractional Transformation 

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#### Abstract

In this letter, we assemble a new substitution box (S-box) using fractional linear transformation of a particular type and analyze proposed box for different analysis such as Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC), Bit Independent Criterion (BIC), differential approximation probability (DP), linear approximation probability (LP) and nonlinearity. Further, we evaluate the results of these analyses with AES, APA, Gray, Xyi, Skipjack, $\mathrm{S}_{8}$ AES and Prime S-box to know the rank of our proposed box comparative to other boxes.


Key words: S-box. graphical SAC. LP . DP . BIC

## INTRODUCTION

The Block cipher is a vital branch of cryptography and Substitution box is the indispensable component of numerous block ciphers, which is capable to produce puzzlement in the plaintext during the process of encryption. So, at some extent we can say that the strength of the block cipher mainly depends on S-box, that's why many researchers have shown attention to improve the quality of S-box and develop some analysis to determine the confusion capability of Sbox. There are many analysis existing in literature such as Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC), Bit Independent Criterion (BIC), differential approximation probability (DP), linear approximation probability (LP) and nonlinearity.

In this letter, we proposed a new Sbox using a particular type of fractional linear transformation $\frac{45 z+10}{2 z+9}$ and analyze proposed Substitution box with some well known analyses which have discussed earlier. These analyses include nonlinearity, BIC, SAC, LP, DP etc, these criterions are necessary for a good S-box. Proposed Sbox does not satisfy all criterions entirely but close to the optimal value. So we can make use of it in encryption for secure communication.

This paper is structured as follows; section 2 present analysis of S-box which includes nonlinearity analysis, bit independent criterion analysis, linear approximation probability analysis, differential approximation probability analysis, analytical strict avalanche criterion analysis, graphical strict avalanche analysis and section 3 presents conclusion.

Algebraic expression of proposed $S$-box: The algebraic structure of proposed S-box is a function
f: $\operatorname{PGL}\left(2, \mathrm{GF}\left(2^{8}\right)\right) \times \mathrm{GF}\left(2^{8}\right) \rightarrow \mathrm{GF}\left(2^{8}\right)$
$f(z)=((45 z+10) /(2 z+9))$ where $45,10,2,9 \in G F(2)$


Flow chart of proposed S-box

| $\mathrm{GF}(2)$ | $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{z})=((45 \mathrm{z}+10) /(2 \mathrm{z}+9))$ | Proposed S-box elements |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0 | $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{z})=((45(0)+10) /(2(0)+9))$ | 221 |
| 1 | $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{z})=((45(1)+10) /(2(1)+9))$ | 69 |
| . | $\cdot$ | . |
| . | $\cdot$ | . |
| . | $\cdot$ |  |
| 254 | $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{z})=((45(254)+10) /(2(254)+9))$ | 44 |
| 255 | $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{z})=((45(255)+10) /(2(255)+9))$ | 239 |

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Table 1: Construction of proposed S-box

| 221 | 69 | 158 | 6 | 34 | 81 | 146 | 193 | 241 | 242 | 240 | 0 | 182 | 217 | 10 | 45 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 206 | 153 | 74 | 21 | 154 | 54 | 173 | 73 | 251 | 110 | 117 | 231 | 63 | 84 | 143 | 164 |
| 151 | 236 | 246 | 76 | 70 | 98 | 129 | 157 | 28 | 204 | 23 | 199 | 49 | 220 | 7 | 178 |
| 160 | 96 | 131 | 67 | 75 | 127 | 100 | 152 | 82 | 254 | 228 | 145 | 65 | 196 | 31 | 162 |
| 194 | 126 | 101 | 33 | 106 | 130 | 97 | 121 | 78 | 189 | 38 | 149 | 137 | 68 | 159 | 90 |
| 92 | 50 | 177 | 135 | 174 | 255 | 227 | 53 | 138 | 181 | 46 | 89 | 32 | 55 | 172 | 195 |
| 218 | 223 | 4 | 9 | 52 | 39 | 188 | 175 | 119 | 102 | 125 | 108 | 156 | 40 | 187 | 71 |
| 80 | 3 | 224 | 147 | 213 | 165 | 62 | 14 | 198 | 47 | 180 | 29 | 19 | 86 | 141 | 208 |
| 120 | 134 | 93 | 107 | 216 | 43 | 184 | 11 | 226 | 66 | 161 | 1 | 114 | 212 | 15 | 113 |
| 186 | 64 | 163 | 41 | 252 | 91 | 136 | 230 | 133 | 229 | 253 | 94 | 72 | 237 | 245 | 155 |
| 20 | 2 | 225 | 207 | 118 | 179 | 48 | 109 | 22 | 132 | 95 | 205 | 42 | 5 | 222 | 185 |
| 192 | 238 | 244 | 35 | 77 | 197 | 30 | 150 | 170 | 111 | 116 | 57 | 124 | 37 | 190 | 103 |
| 26 | 36 | 191 | 201 | 105 | 85 | 142 | 122 | 171 | 8 | 219 | 56 | 176 | 27 | 200 | 51 |
| 167 | 24 | 203 | 60 | 144 | 99 | 128 | 83 | 215 | 139 | 88 | 12 | 115 | 169 | 58 | 112 |
| 210 | 18 | 209 | 17 | 79 | 168 | 59 | 148 | 214 | 247 | 235 | 13 | 166 | 232 | 250 | 61 |
| 104 | 16 | 211 | 123 | 248 | 249 | 233 | 234 | 140 | 25 | 202 | 87 | 243 | 183 | 44 | 239 |

Proposed S-box in the form of $16^{*} 16$ matrix

Table 2: The results of nonlinearity analysis of S-boxes

| S-boxes | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Average |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Proposed S-Box | 102 | 104 | 98 | 108 | 104 | 102 | 108 | 106 |  |
| AES S-box | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 |
| APA S-box | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 |
| Gray S-box | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 |
| S8 AES S-box | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 | 112 |
| Skipjack S-box | 104 | 104 | 108 | 108 | 108 | 104 | 104 | 106 | 105.75 |
| Xyi S-box | 106 | 104 | 104 | 106 | 104 | 106 | 104 | 106 | 105 |
| Residue Prime | 94 | 100 | 104 | 104 | 102 | 100 | 98 | 94 |  |
| Maximum value $=108$ | Minimum value $=98$. Avage value $=104$ |  |  |  | 99.5 |  |  |  |  |

$\overline{\text { Maximum value }}=108 ;$ Minimum value $=98 ;$ Average value $=104$


Fig. 1: Comparison of Nonlinearity of proposed S-box with some well known S-boxes

The flowchart of the proposed S-box is presented in above figure. Here also, the method starts with the input of Galois field and the process of construction of
new S-box is achieved in the second step. In step 3 we get proposed S-box. The construction process of proposed S-box is further explained in Table 1.


Fig. 2: Comparison of average nonlinearity of BIC of proposed S-box with different S-boxes

## ANALYSES OF S-BOX

In this section, we will present some useful analysis of S-box based on residue of prime number.

Nonlinearity: The nonlinearity of a Boolean function can be defined as the distance between the function and the set of all affine functions. In other words we can say that, Non-linearity is the number of bits which must be changed in the truth table of a Boolean function to reach the closest affine function. The upper bound of nonlinearity is: $\mathrm{N}(\mathrm{f})=2^{\mathrm{n}-1}-2^{\mathrm{n} / 2-1}$ [2], for S-box in $\operatorname{GF}\left(2^{\mathrm{n}}\right)$. As S-box in AES is in $\operatorname{GF}\left(2^{8}\right)$, the optimal value of N is 120 .

It is observed from Fig. 1, that the proposed S-box has the ability if evaluated in terms of nonlinearity analysis.

Bit independent criterion: The output Bits Independence Criterion (BIC) was also first introduced by Webster and Tavares [3] which is another desirable property for any cryptographic design. It means that all the avalanche variables should be pair-wise independent for a given set of avalanche vectors generated by the complementing of a single plaintext bit.

Figure 2 and Table 4, shows the results of BIC analysis of proposed S-box. The BIC of the proposed S-box is acceptable in the sense of encryption strength. This analysis shows that the rank of our proposed box is comparable with S-boxes from literature.

From Table 4 and 6 and Fig. 2 and 3 we can observe that proposed S-box satisfied bit independent criterion close to the best possible value.

Linear approximation probability: The linear approximation probability is the maximum value of the imbalance of an event. The parity of the input bits
selected by the mask Gx is equal to the parity of the output bits selected by the mask Gy. According to Matsui's original definition [4], linear approximation probability (or probability of bias) of a given s-box is defined as:

Table 3: The nonlinearity of BIC of proposed S-box

| ---- | 98 | 100 | 106 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 100 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 98 | --- | 104 | 106 | 102 | 98 | 104 | 100 |
| 100 | 104 | ---- | 106 | 104 | 100 | 100 | 106 |
| 106 | 106 | 106 | ---- | 104 | 106 | 106 | 106 |
| 102 | 102 | 104 | 104 | ---- | 104 | 108 | 106 |
| 102 | 98 | 100 | 106 | 104 | ---- | 106 | 104 |
| 102 | 104 | 100 | 106 | 108 | 106 | --- | 104 |
| 100 | 100 | 106 | 106 | 106 | 104 | 104 | --- |

Table 4: BIC analysis of S-boxes

| S-boxes | Average | Minimum value | Square deviation |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proposed S-box | 98.00 | 103.37 | 2.728 |
| AES | 112.00 | 112.00 | 0.000 |
| APA | 112.00 | 112.00 | 0.000 |
| Gray | 112.00 | 112.00 | 0.000 |
| S8 AES | 112.00 | 112.00 | 0.000 |
| Skipjack | 104.14 | 102.00 | 1.767 |
| Xyi | 103.78 | 98.00 | 2.743 |
| Prime | 101.71 | 94.00 | 3.530 |

Table 5: The dependent matrix in BIC of the proposed S-box

| ---- | 0.500 | 0.511 | 0.525 | 0.523 | 0.488 | 0.503 | 0.496 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0.500 | ---- | 0.503 | 0.496 | 0.490 | 0.503 | 0.486 | 0.542 |
| 0.511 | 0.503 | --- | 0.494 | 0.517 | 0.488 | 0.476 | 0.490 |
| 0.525 | 0.496 | 0.494 | ---- | 0.519 | 0.494 | 0.494 | 0.517 |
| 0.523 | 0.490 | 0.517 | 0.519 | ---- | 0.472 | 0.505 | 0.515 |
| 0.488 | 0.503 | 0.488 | 0.494 | 0.472 | ---- | 0.498 | 0.517 |
| 0.503 | 0.486 | 0.476 | 0.494 | 0.505 | 0.498 | ---- | 0.509 |
| 0.496 | 0.542 | 0.490 | 0.517 | 0.515 | 0.517 | 0.509 | ---- |



Fig. 3: Comparison of dependent matrix of BIC of proposed S-box with different S-boxes


Fig. 4: Graphical comparison of LP of proposed S-box with different S-boxes

Table 6: BIC of SAC analysis of S-boxes

| S-boxes | Average | Minimum value | Square deviation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proposed S-box | 0.502 | 0.472 | 0.015 |
| AES | 0.504 | 0.480 | 0.011 |
| APA | 0.499 | 0.472 | 0.010 |
| Gray | 0.502 | 0.478 | 0.010 |
| S8 AES | 0.502 | 0.478 | 0.010 |
| Skipjack | 0.499 | 0.464 | 0.018 |
| Xyi | 0.503 | 0.470 | 0.015 |
| Prime | 0.502 | 0.470 | 0.017 |

$$
\mathrm{LP}=\max _{\Gamma \mathrm{x}, \Gamma \mathrm{y} \neq 0}\left|\frac{\#\{\mathrm{x} / \mathrm{x} \bullet \Gamma \mathrm{x}=\mathrm{S}(\mathrm{x}) \bullet \Gamma \mathrm{y}\}}{2^{\mathrm{n}}}-\frac{1}{2}\right|
$$

where $G x$ and Gy are input and output masks, respectively; $X$ is the set of all possible inputs; and $2^{n}$ is the number of its elements.

We have calculated the linear approximation probability of proposed S-box and in Fig. 4; we compare it with some well known S-boxes from
literature. The maximum value of LP of proposed Sbox is 0.1328 which is not so bad against linear attacks.

Differential approximation probability: The nonlinear transformation S-box should ideally have differential uniformity. An input differential $\Delta x_{i}$ should uniquely map to an output differential $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}$, thereby ensuring a uniform mapping probability for each i. The differential approximation probability of a given S-box (i.e. DPs) is a measure for differential uniformity and is defined as

$$
\operatorname{DP}^{s}(\Delta x \rightarrow \Delta y)=\left[\frac{\#\{\mathrm{x} \in \mathrm{X} / \mathrm{S}(\mathrm{x}) \oplus \mathrm{S}(\mathrm{x} \oplus \Delta \mathrm{x})=\Delta \mathrm{y}\}}{2^{\mathrm{m}}}\right]
$$

The maximum value of differential approximation probability for proposed S-box is also 0.25 (Table 8). Figure 5 shows the comparison of differential approximation probability of proposed S-box with AES, APA, Gray, $\mathrm{S}_{8}$ AES, Skipjack, Xyi and residue

Table 7: Linear approximation analysis of S-boxes

| $\overline{\text { S-boxes }}$ |  | Proposed Box |  | AES |  | APA |  | Gray | S8 AES |  | Skipjack |  | Xyi |  | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { Prime } \\ & \hline 0.132 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Max LP |  | 0.1328 |  | 0.062 |  | 0.062 |  | 0.062 | 0.0 |  |  | 109 | 0.1 |  |  |
| Max Va | alue | 160 |  | 144 |  | 144 |  | 144 | 14 |  |  | 56 | 16 |  | 162 |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.250 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.039 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.046 |
| 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 |
| 0.015 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.039 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.039 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.039 |
| 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 02323 | 0.031 |
| 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.015 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |
| 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.131 | 0.039 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.023 |  |

Table 8: The differential approximation probability of S-box based on residue of prime number

| S-boxes | Proposed Box | AES | APA | Gray | S8 AES | Skipjack | Xyi | Prime |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Max DP | 0.25 | 0.0156 | 0.0156 | 0.0156 | 0.0156 | 0.0468 | 0.0468 | 0.281 |



Fig. 5: Graphical comparison of DP of proposed S-box with different S-boxes
of prime number S-box. Although the results of DP of proposed box are not so good but comparatively better from Sbox based on residue of prime numbers [1].

Strict avalanche criterion analytically: An S-box satisfies SAC if a single bit changes on the input
results in a change on a half of output bits. Note that when Sbox is used to build an SP network, then a single change on the input of network causes an avalanche of changes.

The results of Table 9 show that the value of strict avalanche criterion of S-box based on res idue of prime number is $\sim 1 / 2$.


Fig. 6: Comparison of SAC of proposed S-box with different S-boxes
Table 9: The results of strict avalanche criterion for proposed S-box

| 0.531 | 0.500 | 0.531 | 0.421 | 0.531 | 0.546 | 0.531 | 0.531 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0.484 | 0.500 | 0.531 | 0.500 | 0.468 | 0.546 | 0.515 | 0.453 |
| 0.515 | 0.546 | 0.437 | 0.515 | 0.515 | 0.531 | 0.484 | 0.546 |
| 0.437 | 0.562 | 0.500 | 0.515 | 0.484 | 0.453 | 0.562 | 0.468 |
| 0.421 | 0.453 | 0.578 | 0.453 | 0.562 | 0.531 | 0.484 | 0.500 |
| 0.453 | 0.500 | 0.406 | 0.546 | 0.596 | 0.437 | 0.500 | 0.500 |
| 0.453 | 0.546 | 0.593 | 0.531 | 0.546 | 0.531 | 0.468 |  |

Minimum value $=0.593$, Maximum value $=0.406$, Average value $=0.505$, Square deviation $=0.021$

Table 10: The SAC of proposed S-box

| S-boxes | Maximum | Minimum | Average | Square <br> deviation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Proposed S-box | 0.593 | 0.406 | 0.505 | 0.0210 |
| AES | 0.562 | 0.453 | 0.504 | 0.0156 |
| APA | 0.562 | 0.437 | 0.500 | 0.0160 |
| Gray | 0.562 | 0.437 | 0.499 | 0.0150 |
| S8 AES | 0.562 | 0.453 | 0.504 | 0.0156 |
| Skipjack | 0.593 | 0.390 | 0.503 | 0.0240 |
| Xyi | 0.609 | 0.406 | 0.502 | 0.0220 |
| Prime | 0.671 | 0.343 | 0.516 | 0.0320 |

Table 10 and Fig. 6 shows the comparison of strict avalanche criterion of proposed S-box with AES, APA, Gray, $\mathrm{S}_{8}$ AES, Skipjack, Xyi and residue of prime number S-box. We have come to know that the value of the proposed S-box is approximately equal to $1 / 2$.

## CONCLUSION

In this work, we analyze proposed S-box for different criterion as described above and bring to a close that proposed S-box does not satisfied all
criterion absolutely but the analysis results are up to the standard. Particularly, the results of Strict Avalanche Criterion are very close to optimal value, so this Sbox can be used in encryption for secure communication. Furthermore the algebraic expression of the proposed S-box is a single step function, when we make use of anticipated S-boxes in any system as a hardware then it is more economical due to the simplicity of its algebraic expression.

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