

Fragile States and the Spread of Terrorism in Africa: Experience from Somalia

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Abstract: The 9/11 terrorists attack on the United States changed both regional and global perception of terrorism. Terrorism is now perceived as a collective security challenge that must be tackled by not just individual states alone but by regional and global bodies. This development rekindled people's consciousness and awareness about the phenomenon and the counter measures to checkmate the menace. This is probably due to improved understand of its humanitarian and socio-economic effects on every societies arising from the experiences of the 9/11 attacks on United States. Unfortunately, despite the coordinated mounting global campaigns against terrorism, the existence of terror networks have continued to spread like wide fire across African hemisphere, especially in Somalia where the activities of the al-shabaab still pose serious threats to regional security and development process. To investigate this menace, this study adopted documentary method in the gathering of data while the content analytical technique was used for data analysis. The theoretical framework that anchored the study is fragile state theory. The study revealed that the presence of terrorist organisation such as al-shabaab in Somalia accounts for the spread of terrorism in African sub-region. It argued that governance culture in Africa, particularly in Somalia has not actually prioritized welfare policies, territorial defence and immediate resolution of inter-clan/inter-ethnic conflicts. The study recommended that African States should improve on welfare policies, embraces good governance and shone corruption in all its ramifications. It equally recommended for a result-oriented national defence policy among African states that will abate the flow of arms and terrorists across their borders.

Key words: Fragility • Terrorism • African states • Security and Somalia

INTRODUCTION

African continent is blessed with enormous human and natural resources that could place the continent at par with other developed continents of the world. Unfortunately, the opposite has been the case due largely to overbearing mixture of issues which include but not limited to; resource mismanagement, bad leadership, corruption, weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement, lack of political will to initiate and implement sustainable welfare policies for her citizens, growing level of poverty and increasing rate of youths' unemployment.

Over the years, these problems have continued to grow among majority of African states despite the collective regional and international measures and intervention policies. The culminated effects and implications of this ugly scenario have trickled down and metamorphosed into state fragility, which manifests in itself in the forms of collapse of essential state structures

and legitimacy crisis, as such making Africa a fertile region for terrorism to thrive. For instance, the challenge of governance and lack of legitimate central government that translated to state fragility in Somalia made warlords (war economists), the al-shabaab and its international cohort, al-Qaeda to take advantage of the political instability and inter-clan crisis in the state to unleash attack on civilians, foreign workers and state structures both in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia [1].

As at January 2017, more than 28 people were killed in an attack on a hotel in Somalia capital, Mogadishu, for which al-shabaab claimed responsibility [2]. Also, the over 67 lives and properties worth millions that was lost on September 2013 at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi consequent to al-shabaab rampage has been a gross humanitarian concern to the international community and African region in particular. This becomes problematic to regional security and development process as displacement of persons keep increasing along with African refugee index. Significantly, the resultant effect of

refugee crisis and terrorist attack on industrial and economic facilities has really worsened the economic condition of Somalia and neighbouring states due to the ripple effect of terrorism except for warlords and some citizens who control ‘scattered revenue sources’ in Somalia due to lack of legitimate central government. This situation gives energy to the vulnerable and porous nature of Somalia borders for the free flow of arms and terrorist which consequently predisposes the citizens’ recruitment into the membership of terrorists group either forcefully or willingly. The overall consequence of this ugly development has been spread of terrorist networks across African sub-region which invariable poses a grave danger to the political stability and socio-economic development of the region. This paper attempts to examine the phenomenon of fragile states in Africa and the spread of terrorism with special interest in Somalia. To this end, this study took an overview of the internal conditions that shaped Somalian political environment and the precipitating factors that impetus to the promotion and spread of terrorism in Somalia. The study also made some vital recommendations towards addressing the security challenges meted by terrorist networks in Africa and Somalia in particular.

Theoretical Framework: The theoretical framework that anchors this study is the fragile state theory. The central assumption of the fragile state theory is that prolonged instability/crisis in any state structure or institution of the society that arises from ethnic differences, consistent manipulation of state resources by power wielders, undemocratic regime or social policy failure, if unabated, can predispose the state into a volatile situation that creates avenue for further manipulation of those weakness by internal and external forces. In other words, understanding state fragility means understanding when weakness exist unabated in a state institution or essential structures of the society. This theory is associated with Scholars such as; Naude *et al.* [3]; Mwangi [4] and Starr [5].

The relevance of this framework to this study is that when a state fails to demonstrate structural capacity to adapt and manage perceived socio-political crisis in any vital state organ/area, or fails to reasonably demonstrate legitimacy, monopoly of use of power and institutionalize law and order for the harmonious existence of its units, it becomes vulnerable to escalators of major conflict who would take advantage of the situation for political and economic gains. This scenario does not only disrupt socio-political order but gives opportunity to terrorists

networks to establish their beehive in such state or region given the seemingly absence of law and order and state’s inability to control its areas, citizens and resources. This theory is aptly for study because it not exposed the internal and external conditions that gave impetus to the rise of terrorism in Somalia, but the factors that sustained and facilitated the spread of terrorism to other African states which is the essence of this study.

Haven established the cardinal issues in fragile state framework and in relation to understanding the conditions that promoted the deepening fragility of Somalia and the spread of terrorism in Africa, it becomes apparent that the sustained use of clan as tool for political domination by Elders of different clans or warlords and the repressive regime of president Barre Siyad along with absence of legitimate central government to coordinate state’s affairs due to decades of deepened crisis were instrumental in engineering the civil wars that produced violent youths that initiated the al-shabaab movement in 2006 and its subsequent affiliation with al-Qaeda.

Significantly, the presence of Puntland government and Somaliland government and other warring factions, each claiming control of its area and possess substantial capacity to impart violence indicates the level of fragility and situation that has enhanced the continuous operation of al-shabaab in Somalia and neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya [4]. Thus, the propositions of this framework shall be instrumental in guiding this study in analyzing and understanding the correlating factors and conditions that made Somalia a fragile state and by extension increased the spread of terrorism and security traitors in African region.

Clarification of Theoretical Issues

Fragility of African State: Most sovereign states in Africa are structurally weak and have become too vulnerable to internal chaos and external manipulation due to deep rooted historical record of inter-ethnic bloodbath (e.g. Rwanda genocide of 1994), abuse of rule of law by power wielders, absence of genuine statesmen, high level of poverty and seeming absence of good governance ideals. Thus, it becomes apt to note that sustainable legitimacy has largely eroded governance and the entire nation-building process among majority of African states. The logic is that internal uproar of any kind has strong negative implication on governance process.

A continent with increasing index of refugee due to internal displacement of persons and humanitarian crisis simply showcases seeming failure in governance and ineptitude in leadership culture. This scenario has given

a colouration of fragility among majority of states in Africa. Though, in recent years, concerted regional and international efforts have played significant role in curbing the drivers of fragility in most African countries towards achieving a conceivable politically stable states. This aim was pursued through the championing of democratic ideals, assisting in restoring peace in war-torn areas (peacekeeping operations) and improved humanitarian response from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR).

Haven noted this, Nay [6] captures that a fragile state is a low-income country that essentially characterized by weak state legitimacy/state capacity, leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks. Furthermore, the World Bank, for example, deems a country to be fragile if it (a) is eligible for assistance (grant) from the International Development Association (IDA), (b) has had a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the last three years and (c) has received a governance score of less than 3.2 (as per the country performance and institutional assessment (CPIA) index of the world bank).

A fragile state is significantly volatile to crime in one or more of its sub-system. Thus, a fragile state has lost structural capacity to absorb, adapt and manage both internal and external shock. Specifically, some of these internal shocks include natural disasters, population growth, group violence arising from institutionalized political exclusion and economic decline [7]. In this scenario, the state will lose monopoly of use of power to command law and order as such it becomes fragmented into different security organizations. The implication is that essential state institutions will fall under the manipulation of warlords, ethnic strongmen, or other non-state power brokers either for economic or political gains.

Drawing from the foregoing and in relation to African states' experiences in fragility indicators as noted above, it becomes ripe to submit that most African states are trapped in deep fragility. For instance, a report from Fund for Peace in 2016 indicates that African states like South Sudan, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo are mired in civil wars or insurgencies of one form or the other. As a corollary, this unabated civil wars have made those states to lose the totality of their governance capacity as such, placed a question mark on their sovereignties. Specifically, what we know as African First World War that took place in 1994 and 2003 in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), its post-conflict effect along with rebel operations in the Eastern areas has continued to make DRC a vulnerable and fragile state. Meanwhile, the on-going civil war/armed

conflict in Central Africa Republic (CAR) between the government forces, rebels from the Seleke coalition and the anti-Balaka militias has made CAR an enclave of terror with attendant humanitarian crisis, thereby deepening its fragility. More so, the over-heated South Sudanese civil war involving supporters of President Salva Kiir and his Vice, Riek Machar has made the nascent state indescribably volatile as socio-political order has eroded. Of course, Somalia till date has remained without legitimate central government that would regulate state affairs. A situation that has endangered social cohesion and posed threat to regional peace as al-shabaab terrorists keep enjoying a 'fair weather of lawlessness'.

An Overview of Internal Conditions That Predispose Somalia to Fragility: Somalia as a sovereign state was created in 1960 following the merger of British Somaliland protectorate and the colony of Italian Somaliland. The United Republic of Somaliland was ruled by a democratic government for nine years until it was toppled by a military coup and Major Gen. Barre Siyad took over [8]. It was in the light of this political foundation that Somalia was exposed to series of conflicts over struggle for power, civil wars and legitimacy crisis came up.

Consequent to this Scenario, law and order was relegated to the background as violent opposition from the Northern clan overthrew the repressive regime of Siyad Barre and declared it republic of Somaliland. Collier and Hoeffler [8] further captures that as the northern region declared itself republic of Somaliland with its government, violence between rival warlords increased in the South over political control, leading to the death of thousands of civilians which prompted the UN Security Council to sponsor a US led intervention in 1993. Meanwhile before 1993, the conflictual atmosphere that attracted the international intervention coincided with ousting of President Barre from the rein of power. His removal from power in 1990-1991 was greeted with outright state collapse due to unbridled inter-clan rivalry over control of valuable towns, seaports and seats of government (e.g. municipals). Young gunmen fought principally to secure war booty and were under the loosest control of militia commanders. Powerful merchants and warlords were implicated in this war economy too. This scenario led to humanitarian crisis and famine in 1992 thus, prompting international relief operations. Suffice it to note that food aid by NGOs became parts of war economy given that militia commanders diverted those supported relief funds and use it in funding wars and arms. Thus, some businessmen were enriched by war –

related criminal activities such as weapon sales, diversion of food aid, drug production and exportation of scrap metal [9: 4]. Though as lawlessness pervaded the south region of Somalia, the Northern region, otherwise, state of Somaliland had relative peace and stability through the effort of traditional/clan leadership. There was seeming clan cohesion unlike the Southern part that was torn apart by war and needed concerted international intervention. International involvement was significant both in peace keeping operation through African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNIMSON) and setting up a transitional national government [10:17].

Meanwhile the intervention ended shortly after a brutal fire fight in the streets of Mogadishu which led to an unsuccessful incident that has became known as Black Hawk Dow. Significantly, lack of internal cooperation and divided interest over resource control by clan leaders and warlords contributed in weakening international effort to restore legitimate government and stability in Somalia especially in the Southern region thereby making it ever porous to arms flow and conflict prone.

As at 1991 to 2010, political structures and democratic institution in Somalia were so battered and fragile that the country indescribably split and had fourteen separate governments each exercising minimal control over the resources within its domain or clan. Menkhaus [11] aptly captures that state failure and the crisis that enmeshed Somalia can be best understood by identifying the significant impact of the major armed conflicts that took place between 1977 and 1991.

This implies that 17 years after Somalia independence (1960-1977), there was no major armed conflict. The first major armed conflict that laid the seed of fragility in Somalia was the Ogaden war with Ethiopia (1977-1978), in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali-inhabited region of the Ogaden. Though, Somalia lost the war and suffered around 25,000 casualties. Those losses sowed the seeds of future internal conflict prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements' with the intent of overthrowing the regime of Siyad Barre, whom they held accountable for their misfortune. It is pertinent to note that these liberation movements were formed along clan lines for political gain. For instance, the first of these movements was the Somali salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) established in 1978 by Yusuf Abdullahi which operated from the Northeast of the country under the Majerten clan.

The second major armed conflict that deepened the vulnerability of Somalia as a sovereign state was the war between Somali military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia. The SNM was formed in 1981 by some members of the Isaaq clan following the Ogaden war. Isaaq grievances deepened over the course of the 1980's when the repressive regime of Siyad Barre placed the northwest under military control and used the military administration to crack down on the Isaaq and dispossess them of their businesses. This scenario led to heavy civil war and lives were lost as over 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees with unaccountable number of persons that were internally displaced. These atrocities fueled Isaaq clan's demand for secession in what became the self-declared state of Somaliland in 1991 [11:32].

Meanwhile continuous conflict between government forces and growing number of clan-based liberation movements especially within 1989 and 1990 created more avenues for the spread of arms and light weapons as the attention of international arms sellers both within Africa and globally was attracted.

In the light of the foregoing, Shay [12], noted that the control assumed by Islamic courts union (ICU) in the Southern part of Somalia and its imposition of Sharia law amidst internal disputes attracted resistance from the Transitional Federal Government of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed with the assistance of Ethiopian troops, AU peacekeepers and air support by the United states. This eventually led to the dismissal of Islamic Courts Union. Some of the radical youths of the defunct ICU grouped themselves into the formation of al-shabaab in 2006. The newly formed al-shabaab describes itself as youths (al-shabaab) waging jihad against enemies of Islam (foreign influence). The al-shabaab is ideologically guided to resist any foreign-backed government or external intervention in form of aid and has the aim of exercising dominance and control over Southern Somalia and its region. The resultant effect of this situation has always impeded on regional and western humanitarian initiative in the crisis area. In view of this, Jon Lee reports that;

The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled since 2007, to an estimated 3.6 million. But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence in southern Somalia, because the al-Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on western non-governmental organizations. International relief

supplies are flown or shipped into the country and distributed, wherever possible, through local relief workers. Insurgents routinely attack and murder them too; forty-two (42) have been killed in the past two years alone [13:32].

Fragility of Somalian State and the Spread Terrorism in Africa: a Theoretical Discourse: In the early twentieth century and in recent years, especially with the end of the second world war (WWII), from 1939-1945 and the upsurge of Arab spring, insecurity both at global and continental level has been on the rising side with terrorism taking a central stage. In other words, the rising trend of terrorism and its global security implication has strong connection to “arms fall-out” of WWII and the ideological wave of Arab spring. This is due to spill-over effect of the above events on state structures and consequent access to arms both by state and non-state actors.

Meanwhile, apart from the global security implication of Arab spring and “arms fall-out” of WWII, some other strategic factors have combined and laid a fertile foundation for terrorism to spread at will, especially in states that have the challenge of statecraft as evident in Somalia. Thus, the trend of terrorism and its havoc has indescribably trickled down and posed challenge to the peace, security and development process of Africa and Somalia in particular. Significantly, terror activities have grown exponentially in the African continent not only in terms of the number of attacks but also increased the number of countries affected due to increased proliferation of terrorist groups and unmonitored flow of illegal weapons. For instance, on the rate of attack and countries affected, START [14] captures that the major attack carried out by Somalia-based al-shabaab include the 2nd April 2015 massacre at Garissa University, Kenya near its border with Somalia, where a total number of 148 people died. Also, Al-shabaab attacked the Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre in 2013 when at least 68 people died. Al-shabaab has kept on attacking its neighbouring Kenya on the ground that Kenya hitherto, sent its troop into Somalis territory where they have joined the 22,000 strong African Union forces to battle the militants [15].

Meanwhile, terrorism in its broadest sense is the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as means to create terror or fear in order to achieve political, religious or ideological aims [16]. This implies that where there is terror or indiscriminate violence, the possibility of arms is high and the security of lives, especially civilians and properties will continue to be endangered. Buttressing on

this, the United States Code Title 22 chapter 38, section 2656f (d) defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. By inference, every terrorist group has a targeted political aim (either to disrupt governance process or dislodge an existing political ideology), attacks state’s facilities and inflict fear on civilians. This distinguishes terrorism from any other social group.

Apart from terrorist groups who have made their presence felt both at regional and global level such as; Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hezbollah (Lebanon) Taliban (Afghanistan), al-Qaeda (operating worldwide), Boko-Haram (Nigeria), the al-shabaab with external support has followed suit to establish a worrisome influence in Somalia and has continued to spread its operation beyond the coast of East Africa due to some unmonitored strategic factors that have inter-played over the years. Imperatively, these factors, if not curbed through a decisive and concerted counter-terrorism effort by the United Nations and African Union, will make Somalia the next hotbed for international terrorism in few years from now. These factors are discussed below:

Illegal Arms Market: It is imperative to note that the extent to which terrorism will thrive in any region will always be in right proportion to the availability and flow of illegal arms and weak state security measures of such region. This reasoning correlates with the trendy scenario of illegal arms market in Somalia, where private businesses, nation-states, arms dealers, Somalis in the Diaspora and local clan/militia contribute to the growing number of smuggled weapons in the country. Mwangi [4] aptly captures that:

The Somali arms market, based in Mogadishu, is a key hub for arms trading in East Africa and weapons are constantly being transported along its porous border of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Kenya government estimates that thousands of small arms are smuggled across the border every year. In fact, the Kenya government is finding it difficult to fight crime as a result of the large number of illegal arms smuggled from Somalia [4:3].

This scenario will not only make arms available for terrorist groups, but will also facilitate internal conflict process among different ethnic/clan groups at any

slightest provocation, thereby endangering both human lives and regional order. It is imperative to underscore that Somalia is strongly divided into different governments and local authorities and each is well armed within its jurisdiction with one terrorist affiliation or the other. This scenario has tremendously posed a great threat to the peace and security of Northeast Africa and beyond. Mwangi [4] further asserts that small arms are so prolific in Somalia that they are a form of currency in most parts of the country despite United Nations Security Council Resolution of 751 which placed arms embargo on Somalia.

Absence of Legitimate Central Government: Another strategic factor that has significantly promoted the seeming unabated spread of terrorism in Somalia is the absence of legitimate and functional central government. Ideally, government represents the existence of a state. It is the government that manages the presence, affairs, authority and nature of power relations in the state as well meddles in inter-group crisis. It behooves on a legitimate government to initiate and implement decisive national defence policy through its military institution and effectively regulate import-export relations as this will help to checkmate the movement of persons and keep the border relatively safe.

Essentially, the protective power of the state lies in her monopoly of use of power. But unfortunately in Somalia, what we have presently is “clan governments” with a weak federal government that was corruptly handpicked by the parliamentarians under the leadership of President Mahmed Abdullahi Farmajo. According to Onyulo [17] the recent election that took place in Somalia was conducted by members of the parliament instead of voters because of threat of violence by the al-shabaab extremist group. Lawmakers held their vote in an aircraft hanger at a former air force base for added security. Meanwhile, the US, EU and UN has condemned the undemocratic process that greeted the electoral process.

This scenario indicates that Somali statehood is not just fragile but precarious and illegitimate as such, has little or no public confidence. Suffice it to note that when a government has no public confidence and trust, it won't have internal support to pursue a state course like national security thereby, creating a big political vacuum in governance process. The resultant effect of this situation is that the al-shabaab terrorists has taken advantage of this political vacuum and this has continued to thwart every effort towards restoring law and order as socio-economic conditions continue to deteriorate.

Drug Economy: The territorial fragility of Somalia is not just expressed in the high level of illegal arms flow, but also in the unbridled and unregulated import of dangerous drugs like the khat (a narcotic leaf with high stimulating properties). Though, Mwangi [4] noted that khat is considered legal in many countries. It is an addictive drug and it is estimated that approximately 75% of all males in Somalia use it and trade in it. The implication is that such drug can stimulate youths into violence tendencies or expose them to criminal behaviours that is associated with weaponry and by extension becomes prone to rebel/militant groups like the al-shabaab where they can feel secured and showcase their violent act.

The reasoning above shows that there is a correlation between availability of stimulating drugs, willingness to be armed and the spread of violence and terrorist act. In other words, when there is unregulated drug economy, it provides ample opportunity for warlords to either trade or exchange drugs for arms in their pursuit for political and economic gains thereby promoting the spread of violence and terrorism. Mwangi [4] captures that the United Nations panel of experts on Somalia reported in 2003 that many warlords now control the khat trade and use the proceeds to buy weapons needed to maintain control of their territory and also pay troops who are loyal to them. Meanwhile, in the light of war economy, the al-shabaab terrorists have continued to control the southern Somalia and its revenue sources with affiliation with ethnic warlords.

The Role of Al-Qaeda and other Terrorist Networks: Another factor that has enhanced the smooth operation of al-shabaab terrorists and made Somalia their safe Haven is the unalloyed high-way intelligent and training support it receives from its foreign counterpart, al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist network with strong links in Middle East, Africa and strategic loyalists scattered across Europe who specialize on intelligence gathering and dissemination. As at February 2012, former al-shabaab leader, Ahmed Gadane said he pledged obedience to al-Qaeda head, Ayman al-zawahiri [15].

Meanwhile, further reports indicate that al-shabaab may have formed links with other militant groups in Africa such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb that based in the Sahara desert. Significantly, the intelligence support and tactical training the al-Qaeda is giving to the al-shabaab has aided their successful operations in Kenya and Ethiopia. This link has continued to expand its operational scope at the expense of regional peace.

The Issue of Piracy: Significantly, warlords both in Somalia and within African region have taken advantage of Somali coast and the gulf of Aden to source for illegal fund and sponsor one conflict or the other either for economic or political gain. This situation is the implication of collapse in Somali maritime laws and regulations. The international Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that there were 111 reported piracy attack off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in 2008. This resulted in the seizing of 49 vessels by pirates and kidnapping of more than 600 crew members for ransom. Thus, one way or the other, piracy money is laundered and finds its way into other parts of Africa and the Middle East, increasing the possibility that funds will support terrorism. This situation implies that the territorial arrangement of Somalia both at maritime and land level is in high state of lawlessness and this has greatly impinged on the security of neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia.

CONCLUSION

This study argues that the prevailing socio-political atmosphere in most of Africa states such as; South Sudan, Sudan, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia in particular is not just fragile but has assumed outright departure from the perspective of good governance. Thus, unless an expedient and concerted intervention measure is taken to address the menace, these states will either relegate themselves to ‘modern state of nature’ or shall continue to be a comfortable abode for warlords and terrorists.

This study also observes that the major problem with African states and their governance process is the absence of statesmanship as expressed in lack of leadership commitment to do the needful by respecting the rule of law, prioritizing citizens’ welfare policies and abide to the ideals of democracy. Thus, what we have in Africa are strong ethnic men and warlords who parade themselves as statesmen pursuing one economic or political gain. The study further noted that this development has been the bane continental progress and has over the decades, trickled down in endangering socio-political order in the region. Significantly, one of the fall-outs of these problems is terrorism which partly has its root from internal conflict and weak state governance capacity which Somalia was engrossed with.

Somalia as a sovereign state is a victim of governance irrationality and unbridled political manipulation. This has obviously promoted the presence of terrorists (al-shabaab) around its border and territory.

Thus, the effect of terrorism in Somalia has created a big vacuum in nation-building process which will take decades to address. The reason is because the conflict between factions continues in Somalia and insurgents’ activities grow unabated along with humanitarian crisis, warlords thrive in their economic exploits, accumulating foreign assets and further purchase arms and weapons at the expense of regional security and development.

Recommendations: Having interrogated the internal and external conditions that interplayed, shaped and predisposed Somalia’s environment to terrorism and how same conditions have continued to deepen its fragility and spread terrorism across Africa, this study recommends the followings;

- A concerted international effort for the reconstitution of the state of Somalia under the key role of the United States.
- That apart from regional collective efforts in combating terrorism, there is need for the establishment of a tripartite anti-terrorism pact among Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya given their proximity and the havoc inflicted on their statehood by terrorists.
- A result-based national defence policy among African states that will abate the inflow of arms and weapons through their borders.
- Finally, the Somali federal government should demonstrate good governance and political will by prioritizing policies on citizens’ welfare through the expansion of institutional capacity that will employ youths as this will help to reduce citizens vulnerability to ‘anti-state tendencies’ and also dismember terrorist organizations like the al-shabaab.

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