

## Reflection of Party and State Concept of Political Indoctrination of the Red Army Contingent in the Works of the Soviet State Military Leadership

*Elena Yurevna Bobkova*

The branch of FSEI HPE MSUTM  
named after K.G. Razumovskiy, Samara, Russia

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**Abstract:** Article is addressed to conceptual review of Soviet state military leadership on the political indoctrination of contingent during regulatory processing of military political indoctrination genesis concepts in a relatively peaceful time for the country that emerged from the insanity of the Civil War fratricide (in the first half of the 1920s). Authors consider change of the political indoctrination vector from "coercion dominant" to "conviction dominant". Development of methodological pluralism trends in national historical science allowed the author to conduct the research within the context of critical conceptualization on gained historiographical experience on a concerned problem using problem-chronological method.

**Key words:** Political indoctrination • The army • The Soviet state leaders

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### INTRODUCTION

Dynamically developing modernization processes in the Russian army require revision of many of the basic concepts of its operation, including moral building that is not an exception.

Effective moral building of the military personnel is the cornerstone, which in no small part provides the military efficiency of defensive payloads. The relevance of the development of new effective moral building concepts in the armed forces necessitates access to the accumulated historical experience, relative to the times of making "a new breed" army, which includes also 20's years of the last century.

The history of Soviet society and especially historical events of the fledging years, represent the subject of fierce debate in the literature of the last decade. At the same time, it is this chronological period that was characterized by formation and development of the armed forces, which had no analogues in the world - the army of a new type namely the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (hereinafter-the Red Army) that rose through the ranks from "electoral principle" in the organization of the exercise of command to the regular conscript of Red Army.

It is axiomatic that today's army has a qualitative difference from the army of 20's of the last century,

though the accumulated historical experience of political indoctrination of the contingent during the establishment and development of the Red Army is relevant still today in improving current practices of military pedagogy and indoctrination methodology in the Combined Forces of the Russian Federation, especially when searching for the methodological approaches of formation the readiness and ability of the personnel to "resist hostile information and psychological influence and attempts of the extremist forces to split the troops based on political, religious and national motives" [1].

**The Main Part:** Within the scope of this article the author conducted an analysis of the conceptual approaches of the two Soviet state leaders (V.Lenin and J. Stalin) to political indoctrination system of the military personnel in the 20's of the XX century-the time of regulatory processing of military political indoctrination genesis concepts in the Red Army in a relatively peaceful time for the country that emerged from the insanity of the Civil War fratricide.

It should be noted that the concerned time period was characterized by succession of conceptual lines in the development of political indoctrination system in the army, which was formed during the Civil War; this system was included into the party and political work in the Red Army as one of the dominant elements [2. p.7].

A little earlier, in December of 1919, the 1<sup>st</sup> All-Russian Congress of political mentors had decided to rename the "moral building" of the Red Army contingent to the "political indoctrination" that emphasized the political focus of the formed moral building system. Following the results of the Congress, the establishment of schools of political awareness in defensive payloads of the Red Army was one of the main tasks.

Leading theoretician of the military and political indoctrination, a priori, is V. Lenin, the leader of the Soviet Russia, who developed his own concept in the hardest times of the national spiritual crisis of the Revolution and the Civil War [3] and actively developed this concept during the concerned period, with due regard to the objectively existing realities of the new "peaceful" time.

Analysis of Lenin's works suggests that he emphasized the problems of theoretical study and practical construction of political indoctrination system in the army to the end of his life.

Even during the Civil War, he made a significant contribution to the practical aspects of the problem, developing and proving guidelines, forms, methods and means for organization of political indoctrination system of the Red Army soldiers and commanding officers. The principle of "bringing to one's mind and heart" the aims and objectives of the Soviet Russia government served the basis for Lenin's conceptual perception of the political indoctrination methodology of the Red Army [4, v.38, p.50].

Methods for practical implementation of this principle during the concerned period were quite variable, ranging from communications work to educational and cultural activities; these methods aimed at increasing the number of political mentors in the armed forces and strengthening the party in the army. In late 1925, the Red Army numbered 74,800 communists and 73,838 Komsomol members. The number of workers in the party organizations of the Red Army reached 40% [2, p.45].

It seems essential to underline that in Lenin's conceptual position on the political indoctrination issues, the conviction dominant was in dialectical unity with the coercion dominant that was determined by the specific historical situation. In the extreme conditions of the Civil War the coercion dominant came to the fore that is conclusively proven in scientific studies of native and foreign researchers [5-8].

Analysis of historiographical and historical sources on the problem under consideration [6, 7, 8, 9] indicates that the formation of the political indoctrination concept of the Red Army contingent occurred in dialectical

unity with the concept of patriotism, based on the proletarian internationalism and theory of world revolution. The concept of "patriotism", in terms of defense of the native land, was transformed into the idea of the "defense of the socialist homeland" through "sound and strong army" forces [4, v.38, p.343], based on the class approach [4, v.38, p.428], to the benefit of "strengthening the relationships with international socialism" [4, v.38, p.292].

According to the Lenin's concept, political consciousness of the Red Army soldiers and commanders would have based on the following benchmarks: the defense of the new Soviet republic through the complete defeat of the imperialist aggressor (the concept of "imperialist aggressor" included both "class-alien" compatriots and the Entente combatants); creating conditions for the successful building of communism both in Russia and beyond its boundaries; these could be achieved through the military victories of "new type" army - the socialist army, a bulwark of the people's power.

The political indoctrination concept of the first Soviet state leader could not but affect the views of his comrades-in-arms on party, political and state leadership of the country. Whereas some of Lenin's conceptual elements are of conditionally "moderate" nature, the conceptual views of his successor J. Stalin can be described as exceptionally "radical" perception, despite their partial "sub-current" declarative slogans.

J. Stalin held the most radical position in defining the conceptual aspects of political indoctrination in the army, being a supporter of repressive approach to the military staff in the military discipline strengthening process [10]. His conceptual views, like Lenin's views, were formed under the conditions of the Civil War and then were projected in a more "softened" form to a relatively peaceful period of country's development in the 1920's.

Noting the international class nature of the Red Army, he considered the army as a linking element in the social relations system of the new Soviet state: "The Army is a school, the rallying point of the workers and peasants and from this point of view it is the party's power and impact, which are of paramount importance; to this extent army is the greatest machinery that unites the party with the poor peasantry" [11].

Stalin's conceptual perception of military personnel's political indoctrination was based on the unity of national and social perception of the Red Army, aimed at strengthening the economic and military potential of the country. Indicating the need to create an external

perception of the USSR as a peaceful nation, he stressed the importance of countrywide preparations for war against "capitalist neighborhood", noting that, if necessary, "we will move to the policy of offensive operations" [12]. According to the historical experience, one of the Stalin's main methods in implementation of political indoctrination, as an element of the Red Army strengthening, were massive repressive instruments. Unlike his predecessors, these instruments aimed at not so much eradicating "class-alien elements", as "purging" the army against the former "teammates" that undoubtedly caused irrecoverable harm to staff morale in the troops.

### CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of conceptual approaches of the first Soviet state leaders to the political indoctrination of military personnel allows us to formulate a number of provisions of a general nature.

- When defining the concept of the political indoctrination fundamentals of the Red Army contingent (the need for formation of class consciousness; active political propaganda as a method of forming a political outlook; the international character of political indoctrination; the need to improve the general level of indoctrination in the context of mentoring class political consciousness) during its genesis, almost all leaders show unanimity of opinions, while in the definition of the dominant elements of the system, as well as the methods of its implementation, they show a significant difference.
- Formation and genesis of conceptual views of the Soviet Russia leaders were influenced by not only specific historical situation, but the need to consider the perception specifics of the political indoctrination concept by the target audience in a given historical period. According to the census of 28 August, 1920, the Red Army accounted for 14.4% of persons under the age of 19 years, 65.8% of persons from 20 to 29 years, 18% - from 30 to 39 years, 1.5% - from 40 to 49 years and 0.3% of persons of 50 years and older; i.e. 80.2% of the Red Army personnel was under the age of 29 years, that is, in the age range, where the dialectical unity of the conviction dominant and coercion dominant gives a stable and positive effect when forming political and moral concepts in perception of reality. Emphatically, in addition to age

features, one needs to take into account the low educational level of most of the military staff [13].

- Permanent change of the political indoctrination vector from hard coercion, determined by objective circumstances of the specific historical situation, to the conviction dominant, the development of conscious attitude towards the military duty and political system, observed in Lenin's works, correlates with Stalin's perception of repressive machinery as the dominant method to develop political and moral consciousness in the Red Army personnel.
- Conviction and coercion dominants, as basic methods for implementing the political indoctrination system in the Red Army during the concerned time period, were in close dialectical relationship and taken by the Soviet state leaders as a basis for the national normative legal acts over different historic periods.

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