

The Inveterate Failures of the International Community on Somali Impasse

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Abstract: This research evaluates the failures of the international community to solve the long standing political impulse that has generated humanitarian crisis as well as political, social and military instabilities in Somalia and in the horn of Africa. The nucleus objective of the research is to explicate critically the causes of the failures. Prior to this research no definite work has been done on the subject. The research therefore, investigates the methodology and the strategic framework adopted by the international community in reinstating or overcoming the Somali political and humanitarian impasse. The political history of Somalia is long and painful; as the ruthless civil war ruined the nation for the past two and half decades. Once the central government crumbled in 1991 the institutional structures of the nation went into an eminent impasse. The research adopts evaluative method to cover wider range of ideas and assess the subject matter comprehensively.

Key words: International Interventions • The failures of international community • Somalia • New insights

INTRODUCTION

Historically speaking during the colonial era, starting from 1884, Somalia was divided among Italy, France, Britain, Kenya and Ethiopia and this political division is always accompanied by internal tribal divisions which unfortunately persisted up to the modern era. Tribe not nation is the unit of analysis in the mind of mainstream Somali society. Regrettably, Somali governments of the past and present, be it democratic or authoritarian, used tribe to divide and easily rule; a phenomenon that continued from the time of independent in 1960 to the present day. The main impasse however, started from the collapse of Somalia's last military regime in 1991 and the subsequent civil war, lawlessness and state failure which have devastated the nation for the past two and half decades. Added to this, is the failure of the international community to provide solutions or salvage the nationhood of the country. As a result Somalia remains anarchical and in political and humanitarian turmoil. With that background in mind, this research investigates the failures of the international community in saving Somalia's political entity.

Subsequently, the political history of this nation is long and painful. After its weak, semi democratic parliament failed to elect president; General Mohamed

Siad Barre forcefully took power in 21 October 1969. The military leader immediately presided upon the newly formed Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and renamed the country *the Somali Democratic Republic*. From 1969 to 1991 Somalia had a feared and sometimes respected strong military government in African standard; but one with disoriented foreign policy. In fact, at one point it had problems both with Washington and Moscow concurrently. The attitude towards neighboring nations, including Ethiopia and Kenya also did not help. Domestically, the military ruled the nation with iron fist. Almost with immediate effect, the regime proscribed political parties and civil organizations as well as arrested political rivals and more fatally suspended the constitution.

Nonetheless, the regime aimed to restore freshness of governance and nationalism through Pan-Somali identity; an idea aimed at replacing clan-based politics of preceding governments.

At one point, the regime was inspired by Marxist socialist ideology although ironically it had rocky and odd relations with the former Soviet Union, while simultaneously maintained tactless political and diplomatic relations with the US. Various factors have eventually brought the regime on its knees; these include the huge military increase by the regime and Soviet switch

to support of Ethiopia, an ache enemy of Somalia at the time, the American indifference about the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Somalia, as well as the Ogaden war from 1977-1979.

Initially, Somalia used to be the central point of US strategic interest in East Africa, as it became one of the five main recipients of US aid in Africa, but the military regime failed to harvest the significant high values bestowed upon them by the successive American administrations. To the contrary the regime increasingly became authoritarian under an extensively harsh military rule until the inevitable took place. Finally, in 1991 the world witnessed the demise of one of the strategically located regimes in East Africa, the dismantlement of the Somali National Army and subsequently the beginning of the longest civil war in East Africa.

Once the central government went kaput, the political structures have been ruined and national army dissolved, the Somali political impasse became eminent. The continued clash and clan-based fight further reverberated the situation. The entire nation was devastated. The removal of the dictator who ruled the country for twenty years resulted in fierce encounter between the two factions; General Aidid and his allies on one side and Ali Mahdi and his cohorts on the other side. It is the observation of diverse studies conducted so far that, the war had gravely impacted on this tiny nation in every aspect and brought enduring end to the institutional welfare of the people and its financial, educational and political development. It was this devastating civil war which to this date took deep roots. The severe war which ruined the nation in 1991 and the aftermath continuous battle which had dominated the scene obviously generated the arrival of more warlords and further fueled the already existing conflict between the two main warriors; General Aideed and Ali Mahdi. Each of these warlords endeavored to attain control as the war grew from clan-based rebel organizations to a full-fledged, un-nationalistic, un-patriotic, destructive atmosphere. The era of the warlords was replaced by another era in which the Islamic courts defeated the warlords and united the major parts of the country for about six months before they disintegrated. At this juncture, the hardline military wing of the Islamic courts known as al-Shabaab took control of major regions and cities generating much concern and fear among neighboring nations and international community at large.

The Failures of the International Community in Resolving Somali Impasse:

The civil war which grew from clan-based rebel organizations, after Siyad Barre's repressive regime was overthrown, had ultimately led to the United Nations decisive intervention and US peacekeeping operations in the country. Missions for peace have short-*and* long-term objectives, for example, short-term humanitarian and relief operations and longer term development objectives, institutional capacity building objectives and so on [1]. The deployment of large troops of international forces and peace keepers had in a short period intensified and enormous humanitarian effort took shape [2]. The UN intervention in Somalia had undergone three distinctive stages in the events of three years period of intervention. It has been argued that the first phase covered the year of 1991 and this phase is regarded as 'the UN's year of missed opportunities [2]. This is due to the fact that, the UN and its agencies missed a crucial opportunity of working with surviving local institutions. In addition, this phase was dominated by peace engagement works. In the same year the UN set the stage for Somali mission, making an important move to re-involve and return to Somalia. What is termed phase two refers to the year of 1992. The UN in 1992 worked on ceasefire negotiations and humanitarian initiatives. However, its political scheme took important priority over humanitarian consideration and peacemaking efforts; but made no major attempts to meet the Somali needs [3]. Phase three covered the period of UN military intervention to establish secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. It could be said that, this phase had developed better prospect with general improvement on security conditions [2].

However, the UN failure of what is largely seen as a humanitarian intervention and military operation in Somalia came from the fact that the UN could not impede the escalation of the war which was a clear signal to the failure of its political strategy. It has been further argued that, the UN intervention style and armed enforcement had only perpetrated the catastrophe and most of the time hindered the aid work of other non-governmental organizations. Kenneth Rutherford agrees that "Hundreds of thousands of Somalis had died and more were on the verge of starvation despite the attempts by the UN, regional organizations and around thirty humanitarian non governmental organizations (NGOs) to alleviate the suffering" [4].

Scholars have also observed that, the UN was dejectedly unsuccessful in its emergency representation in Somalia and its presence in Mogadishu was badly tarnished by the sustained failure to stop the ongoing conflicts in the country. Proponents of this position blame the mismanagement and the misuse of resources and the lack on the part of the UN to reinstate public order and bring to an end the ethnic strife. Walter Clarke *et al.* argue that “The United Nations, in taking over the Somalia operation in 1993, clearly did not have the resources or the ability to do the job the United States drew up. The errors that compounded the problem have been chronicled: United Nations was slow in making appointments, it did not appoint very qualified people, its decision-making process was often cumbersome (especially with the U.S. Marines) and it made some extremely poor decisions, as when delaying helping recreate the Somali police force because it preferred to have a government in place first.” [5]. Kenneth further blames poor sources of economy, decadence rule and tribal politics on the ground. “Lack of credit was one major tribulation confronting the Somali people. The others were multiple warlords operating unencumbered, except by each other; depleted food stocks and an imploded agricultural sector; the absence of a functioning central government with which the international community could communicate; and intensive clan divisions resulting in zero-sum outcomes.” [4].

Military and Humanitarian Operations (UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II AND UNITAF): To put things in other perspective, the UN can not be blamed for the failures of all its missions. It came with a good intention of trying to engage the international community, improving and providing emergency aid and an attempt to transform the country to better democratic space. It was also the attacks from the workloads on the ground which has created challenging circumstances and disallowed the UN to set up a dynamic and forceful presence on the ground. It must be recalled that at its initial stage the UN intervened primarily on humanitarian grounds and had no vital interest in the political and ethnic upheavals. The UN Secretary-General Boutros [6] decided to send international troops to Somalia only after a severe famine had erupted in the agricultural area of the county.

In 24 April 1992 the UN Security Council Resolution 733 and UN Security Council Resolution 746 led to the creation of UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia I), with significant task to monitor the ceasefire in

Mogadishu and protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. UNOSOM I was the first stabilization mission of the UN and Ambassador Sahnoun was appointed as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Somalia to help “Coordinate UN agencies and to establish contacts with broad range of Somali factions and communities” and to monitor UN security force initiative of cease-fire “along the ‘green-line’ between Mogadishu north and south” [7].

It is therefore clear that, Ambassador Sahnoun was responsible to develop relief plan, to assist in dividing the country into four zones for the distribution of food aid and to oversee the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance [8]. Nonetheless, UNOSOM I was later given the mandate to collaborate with a coalition of thirty nations known as Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to establish safe environment and ensuring security and order in the face of confrontation and pervasive war. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 which was passed on December 3, 1992 had approved the formation of coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the US [9]. UNITAF was a multi-coalition forces tasked to ensure security on the ground and to enforce peace and engage with the fighting groups.

Similarly the target of UNOSOM II was also humanitarian in nature, although the UN at this stage had learnt lessons. The UN Resolution 814 of UNOSOM II, clearly promulgated its military mission to: “assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia” [10] In its mission statement UNOSOM clearly outlined five priority areas of action: continuing emergency relief operations, resettlement of the displaced, resuscitation of commerce and trade, reinvigoration of the productive sector and rejuvenation of social services [6]. Eventually, in March, 1995 the UN had to pull out completely from the country as its emergency work was clearly confronted with huge challenges. The UN had to leave at this stage for the *raison d’être* that the situation on the ground had deteriorated after spending a total of \$4.4billion as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Military costs of UNOSM I, UNOSM II and U.S. forces in Somalia

U.S. costs for all military operations	\$2 billion 71
UN Costs: UNOSOM I	\$400 million
UN Costs: UNOSOM II	\$1.6 billion72
Additional direct costs, U.S. and U.N. combined	\$400 million73
Total	\$4.4 billion

Source: [11]

With that background in mind, it must be reiterated that the UN should employ a long-term international intervention and well mapped futuristic diplomacy. Reconstruction of the nation must have been the principal main concern. Archer is right to suggest that “promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law” [12]. What was not thought at the time of the initial stage of the calamity is also to accelerate the economic sector and put in place institution of governance as well as upholding the legitimate aspirations of the people. This disquiet emanates from the fact that humanitarian approach is crucial to improve and expand peaceful intervention but without military vigor political stability may not be achieved. At the same time, there are those who oppose peace enforcement and instead favor peace-keeping. The UN commissioners of the 1990s in diverse parts of the world had recommended that: “in peacekeeping... enforcement action should be regarded as the last resort, after all peaceful means have been exhausted” [13]. Jan Eliasson, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs on 21 July 1993 was also in favor to engage in peace enforcement for financial purposes.

Factors Prompted the Failures of the Un and the International Community: The failures of UN international intervention in Somalia and its military mission were mainly due to the obvious inconsistencies in the actions of the international community in responding to the crisis [14]. This was followed by the lack of cooperation and supports from international donors. Another element which has caused the failure was the late international coverage and news headlines. Unfortunately the media was at the time focusing on the war in former Yugoslavia and less exposure was given to the Somali conflict.

Additionally, the UN was not prepared and unequipped to tackle a situation like that of this East African Nation. Sovereignty issue was another issue; as diverse political establishments have opened the debate on sovereignty; at the same time, who should lead the military intervention was not initially planned and this tremendously delayed action for intervention. Penrose *et al.* asserts that “the lack of an integrated political ... strategy meant that no strategic decisions concerning relief effort could be made” [15]. In fact, in the Somali case, the political strategies took precedence over humanitarian assistances; a catastrophic situation which was the main cause for the most severing.

Obstacles on the ground were other major political huddles which have failed the UN to achieve its mission in Somalia. General Aideed refused to cooperate and instead fought back against UN peace-keepers and humiliated the US administration by practically defeating the US forces on the ground. During the operation the UN has failed to work with other international NGOs. On balance, in March 1995, the last unit of the UN forces was evacuated; this signaled an embarrassing failure to achieve its goals. After these failures from 1991-1995 on the part of the international community and the following complete withdrawal from the country there appeared political and humanitarian vacuum.

However when the Islamic Courts took over the country from the warlords in 2006 the international community realized that the rise of Islamic groups may cause even more upsetting consequences. The IC was a political body which included Islamist groups with a range of Islamic ideals; consisting of *Salafs* hardliners and moderate intellectuals. However, the international community failed again for not engaging with the Courts in a way that might have reinforced sensible political conduct. Although their initial intent was to establish minimum security through the enforcement of the *Shari'ah* laws, the Islamic Courts desired to end the chaos and bloodshed in the country, facilitate rebuild the nation and aspired to institute gracious relationship with the international community; including the neighboring nations [16]. The defeat of the warlords in Mogadishu in the hands of the Courts rang no bell in the minds of the international community that the Courts were formidable force and could unite the country provided that they received the necessary political and financial support. Instead of providing assistance the international community questioned the political intent of the courts as they again missed a golden opportunity.

Today Al-Shabaab are the cause of the humanitarian and military failures of the international community; they banned several international aid groups in the areas under their control and some other times redirect aid deliveries to their advantage [17].

Piracy is another serious obstacle as the international community is forced to spend billions on ransoms, insurance premiums, re-routing ships farther out to sea, naval forces and other expenditures as attempts and attacks rise.

Somali pirates attacked over 154 ships in the first half of 2011. Twenty-one ships were successfully hijacked with a total of 362 hostages on board [18].

Another factor which may have contributed to the failures of the international community is the attitude of the troops on the ground; the human rights organization Africa Rights stated that "troops have engaged in abuses of human rights, including killing of civilians, physical abuse and theft. Numerous UNOSOM soldiers have also displayed unacceptable levels of racism toward Somalis." These abuses included opening fire with machine guns against unarmed protesters, firing missiles into residential areas and outright murder youth. The report states "UNOSOM has become an army of occupation" [19].

Endeavor of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM): The next step the international community could take was to form African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On the ground there were several attempts of forming government, one in 2000, after an agreement was reached in Arta, Djibouti, to establish Transitional National Government (TNG), but this survived less than three years and in 2004; following lengthy talks in Kenya a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed. The international community perceived that the Islamic Courts militia could challenge the principally disgraced TFG which had called in Ethiopian military advisers; the gravest political miscalculation in that context and at that point in time, which in fact, led to a second wave of distraction in Mogadishu. Added to this, was the attitude of some radical individuals among the Islamic Courts leadership who imprudently hurled a challenge of punishment at Ethiopia including jihad and the revival of irredentist claims to Ogaden region.

AMISOM was first established to provide security for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and some imperative infrastructures including the port and the airport in Mogadishu. However, the dilemma for AMISOM is that the international community persists to anticipate the African Union should assume the weight of contributing troops. In fact, both the US and the UK have requested the AU to solely contribute. Looking at the AMISOM mandate and its outlook there exist misplaced expectations on the part of the international community about the outcome of the Somali peace process in general. The international community is in the dilemma of once beaten twice shy; the experiences of the 1990s preoccupy their decisions on the future plan of AMISOM. Although the AU believes the protection of the TFG as the only internationally recognized authority in the country, it failed to come up with master plan for peace and development. Nonetheless, the mission must be given

what it requires to maintain its mandate. Therefore, in line with its 2007 mandate, drawing from the Communiqué of the 69th AU PSC meeting on 19 January 2007, AMISOM will continue to carry out peace support operations in Somalia so as to alleviate the situation. It was a good idea that it took over from the Ethiopian forces; and provided that it gets the needed support, the mission is competent to construct secure environment.

Currently the mission is mandated to protect the TFG and its key installations, liaison with the TFG and other stakeholders, support humanitarian assistance and coordinate with international maritime task force. However, that said the UN and other international stakeholders are aware that AMISOM functions under thorny circumstances and with inadequate material and human resources. Hence, without a full-fledged international support, the operation will eventually fail to realize its objectives. The strategic concept between African Union and United Nations which is very much relevant to AMISOM. The Secretary General contended that "At the initiative of the African Union Commission and against the background of the recent progress on the political and security tracks, African Union and United Nations planners jointly developed a strategic concept for future AMISOM operations in Somalia. The concept aims at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against Al-Shabaab, which, in turn, would be critical to extend the authority of the Transitional Federal Government beyond the capital and to create space for the effective implementation of the road map" [20].

The U.N. Security Council and General Assembly has appropriated some \$798 million for AMISOM since July 2008 [21]. The table below stipulates the spending on AMISOM from July 2008 to June 2012.

Nonetheless, to this date, at least on the ground, AMISOM is seen as African forces defending the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The general

Table 2: Total U.N. Security Council and General Assembly spending on AMISOM, July 2008 to June 2012

Year	Expenditure
July 2008 – June 2009	\$75,642,00076
July 2009 – June 2010	\$213,580,00077
July 2010 – June 2011	\$205,221,00078
July 2011 – June 2012	\$303,912,00079
Total	\$798,355,000

All figures are from the United Nations. Figures have been rounded to the nearest

\$ thousand.

public should be given the picture, the functions and the role of the United Nations and how it improves the security and life in general through AMISOM. The international community also failed to set strict key performance indicators (KPI) for the Transitional Federal Government. The perception is that as if the objective of the international community is only to defeat al-Shabaab.

Feeble Current Initiatives: Currently, the international community relentlessly endeavors to achieve political reconciliation for Somalia in order to avoid similar failures and further humanitarian catastrophes. Both the Western world and the Muslim world led by Turkey in coordination with the United Nations are extremely interested to form an acceptable government to improve the situation and realize security. The currently elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appears to be an early upshot of the efforts of the international community. He is not only a civilian but educated as well as committed in getting to the bottom of the Somali political impasse.

Western Initiatives: The United Kingdom hosted a unique initiative of discussion, different from the previous conferences and proposals. After almost six months of political maneuvering and coordinated effort, *the London Conference on Somalia* was held on 23rd February 2012 and lasted for half a day, before it ended with common flavor and a communiqué is approximately indistinguishable from a leaked version a day before the conference. These observations are shared by both international and local observers. Mohammed al-Amin writes “After nearly five months of international diplomatic work and effort, the London conference on Somalia was held on 23rd February 2012 and lasted for half a day. It consisted primarily of pompous speeches typical of such conferences, followed by a final communiqué ... that was revised to appear less focused on security, piracy and counterterrorism and shorter than the draft that was leaked eight days before the conference ... This communiqué was almost identical to the version that was leaked the day before the conference” [22]. Nonetheless, it is believed that this was the effort of the European side of the international community; in an effort to take the lead in the Somali predicament the European nations put pressure on UK to host the conference. This is true on the ground that the Great Britain had never showed interest in Somalia, in fact, in UN Operation Restore Hope (1992-1995), the United Kingdom provided logistical support only. Again Mohammed al-Amin agrees that: “The efforts put into the

conference by the government of the United Kingdom are unprecedented as the UK had never showed interested in Somalia. In UN Operation Restore Hope (1992-1995), for example, the United Kingdom only provided logistical support, in addition to diplomatic activity with different countries, the government was particularly focused on communicating with the Somali community in Britain, holding many different discussions with them” [22]. Other view points on why UK now hosted the conference for Somalia revolve around the contention that UK is interested in the newly discovered oil reserves in the country an argument which is publicly discussed among Somali Diasporas and local community leaders. All these suspicious concerns have indeed lessened the political weight and ethical values of the conference. In effect, some observers talk of failures and another missed opportunity which will be catalogued in the list of failures by the international community.

At the initial stage, the British government acknowledged the past failures, but seems failed to overcome the same reasons that failed earlier conventions. At the beginning of the conference, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office affirmed that “international policy towards Somalia is not succeeding ... after 20 years of sliding backwards, Somalia needs a step-change in effort-both from the international community ... (and from) Somalia’s political leaders”. [23]

Likewise the UK government did not take the Somali leaders to task for their ineffectiveness and political mismanagement for twenty-three years. To the contrary the conference has given a wide statement saying that “The Somali people must determine the shape of their future political institutions” [24]. It was in a state of confusion whether the British government is not aware that earlier conventions had less representation compared to the London conference or this was an intentional statement of indifference. As a matter of fact, earlier conventions such as the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord and the Garowe Principles were welcomed by the London Conference in its communiqué. It explicitly reads: “We welcome the agreements that chart the way towards more representative government: the Transitional Federal Charter, the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord and the Roadmap. We welcomed the progress represented by the Garowe Principles, endorsed the priority of convening a Constituent Assembly and emphasized that the Assembly must be representative of the views of the Somali people of all regions and constituencies and that women must be part of the political process” [24].

This relegating position on the conference has given the impression that although this conference had the best representation and biggest political clout the British had directly or indirectly downgraded it and compared it to those less represented local or regional conferences. In London conference the international political heavy weights including America, Turkey and European Union as well as important Somali regions such as Somaliland have participated in the conference and it was an opportunity to create concrete ground; unfortunately that was not the case. In a similar drawback the conference provided no specific agenda or rather new additional insights into the political outlook. Instead, according to the British Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, the conference “agreed that we needed to focus on addressing the underlying causes of instability, as well as taking immediate action to address the symptoms of Somalia’s problems, in the form of piracy, terrorism, poverty and famine” [25].

The minister further erred when he declared that “the Garowe meetings have made real steps towards replacing the Transitional Federal institutions in August with something more accountable, inclusive and representative” [25]. The other oversight by the London conference is that it has invited only politicians and these are the individuals whom the Somali public effusively aware of their embezzlement and misappropriation of the government funds. In fact, a report written by UN monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea reveals that for every \$10 received, \$7 never made it into the state coffers. An Africa editor for the BBC agrees the aforementioned facts, she observes that: “It is a shame that only Somalis invited to the conference are politicians, some of whom have overseen the chaos and bloodshed in the country. It is difficult to have faith in a government that, according to a recent audit, allowed 96% of all bilateral assistance for 2009 to disappear, most of it presumably into its own pockets” [26]. Similar observation was given by the international crisis group. In its study the group found that: “The government is structurally flawed and resistant to reform. The executive is badly divided between the president and prime minister; the cabinet and federal government is unwieldy, lacking capacity and riddled with corruption; and parliament is large and divided.” [27].

Turkey Initiatives: Apart from the initiatives by the general international community Turkey seems to be single handed in Somali issues. It involves in Somali affairs in its own way and its more visible compared to any other single Muslim or Western Nation. The Prime

Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his wife’s visit to the country in last August was an emotional moment for money Somalis who have not seen a high-profile delegation or officials in their country. Turkey also opened an embassy in Mogadishu in November 2011, at the same time Turkish Airlines has announced the start of regular flights to Mogadishu from 6 March 2012. These are extraordinary initiatives which no nation has done so far during the Somali crisis.

In addition to the aforementioned, there are twelve Turkish humanitarian organizations functioning in the country, as well as several Turkish schools. Turkey took in more than 800 Somali students so far mainly for Islamic studies but some for nursing and other health related education. Turkey Foreign Minister Professor Davutoglu declared that “Soon, there will be a new generation of Somalis trained in Turkey” The minister added that “Turkey has already allocated \$300 million aid to Somalia ... and medical assistance, educational programmes and diplomatic presence in the country”. There is no doubt that Turkey is in "on epic proportions" on its involvement in Somalia. In addition to the Foreign Minister, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains strong voice for Somalia in the world stage. He urged the international community that “without living there, you can not devise the correct policies and you can not help”.

With this approach, the government of Turkey presents new way to the unsuccessful overriding European and American methodologies. Abdi Dirshe, a political analyst based in Canada contends that “Turkey offers an alternative to the failed dominant Western aid paradigm which has been implemented in Somalia and to the Somali war economy. The Somali people are at the centre of the Turkish approach” [28]. Unlike other international players on Somali issue Turkey is calling for strong Somali army and ready to build sturdy public institutions; a call that angers Ethiopia, Kenya and other Christian elements in the region. Nonetheless Turkey has no intent of creating military of religious tension in the region. Ahmet Davutoglu spelled out his vision for future Somalia. “We want Somalia to rise as a prosperous and peaceful country... we also think that the political reform process in Somalia should be carried out within the scope of a wide-scale national compromise under the leadership of the interim government as soon as possible” [24].

To date Turkey hosted two major events on Somalia, the only Muslim country to do so at the international stage. The second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, under the theme “*Preparing Somalia’s future: goals for 2015*”, was held on 31 May and 1 June 2012, maintaining the

approach of the first Istanbul Conference on Somalia, held in 2010. It was attended by representatives from over 56 nations and 11 international and regional organizations, as well as by the Transitional Federal government of Somalia the regional administrations and representatives from civil society and nongovernmental organizations. (Final declaration of the second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, 2012). In fact, what was unique about the Somali conference in Turkey is that it reaffirmed the importance of Somalia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity. Although in a way it was approximating preceding conferences, the international community in Istanbul was more assenting and not confirmatory. Communiqué stated that "Somali people should seek dialogue, reconciliation and political cooperation, including in establishing inclusive, accountable and legitimate governance" (Final declaration of the second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, 2012).

The New Constitution and the Formation of Government:

One major element in the process of getting things into a better perspective is the new constitution which was recently endorsed by the country's National Constituent Assembly (NCA). The new constitution is widely seen as one of the apex legal documents which if implemented will lead the nation to the next steps. The constituent assembly of 825 delegates debated the draft constitution for weeks and voted for the new constitution to replace the 8-year old Somali charter. The international community sees the constitution as the preeminent legal document for Somalia and its adoption is considered as a landmark for a nation devastated by lawlessness.

The former transitional government welcomed the constitution as a milestone which will bring the transitional period by 20 August with the election of a new government for the nation. The international community observed that "The adoption of the Provisional Constitution is a historic achievement as it completes one of the most important milestones towards ending the current transitional period and ushering in a new political future" (The UN Somalia envoy Augustine Mahiga). The election of the new president and parliament has just concluded and in the coming four years it will be seen how this government will be different from other previous governments in finding way out to the impasse.

The AU Commission for Somalia welcomed this new step in the political process of Somalia. In a statement it says "The adoption of a Provisional Constitution by a National Constituent Assembly, representative of the people of Somalia, will protect the gains made and

provide a legal foundation for Somalia's new institutions" (AU Commission for Somalia). The new constitution offers some new insights and recognitions, it gives input to the rights of Somali women, the rights of children and minorities as well as it endorses the supremacy of the Shari'ah as the foundation for all legislations. It precisely highlights the fact that no laws which are not in line or compatible to the general ethos of Shari'ah can be passed, enacted or endorsed in the country. However, one of the main issues in the new constitution is the system of federalism; a new system to the Somali political arena.

The feelings on the ground are that Somalia is a homogenous country as far as its people, religion and language are concerned and its people are not familiar with federalism and it may cause inter-state border conflicts among state governments. In fact, there are those who opine that federalism is a foreign and imported ideology. The fact also remains that the country's political circumstances are delicate and federalism may lead to social decomposition and fresh tribal clashes. The report by Somalia South-Central Non-State Actors or SOSSENSA found that "most of the participants showed very deep concern about the federal system; they favored a unitary system ... a decentralized unitary system with regions or provinces exercising substantial constitutionally guaranteed autonomous powers" (SOSSENSA). Others are of the opinion that the federal system of governance is imposed on the Somali people without proper study. "a federal system of governance is imposed on Somalia without any meaningful consultation with the Somali public" [29]. On balance, it will be an adversity for the international community to fail again on Somalia and that is why it is paramount to put the constitution in proper perspectives.

The international community constantly supports the process of ending the transitional period but it may not yet found a formula that will bring lasting peace.

Concluding Remarks: Another aspect to look at is that, the UN could only provide help and real solution lies in the hands of the Somali people. Obviously, we see today that, the international community has no ability to sustain Somalia indefinitely unless the Somalis themselves are ready to create suitable environment. From this view point, the international community insists that it has not failed in its mission in Somalia. But we know in history that the response of the international community on the verge of the conflict in 1991 was rather timorous and lackadaisical. As a matter of fact, the Security Council Resolution 733 was adopted after one year of the crisis.

Additionally, there was no concrete action due to the usual UN bureaucratic problems and when the operation took off finally, the international community had largely emphasized on humanitarian relief and neglected the political front.

Subsequently, although the UN has given its mandate to its military forces to intervene, the impact on the ground was too slow, instance of this is UNITAF which was given mandate to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operation in Somalia" (UN Secret Resolution 794, December 3 1992) but with this mandate the troops failed to intervene with the pretext that there is no peace to keep and no invitation from the host government. "The UNITAF intervention in Somalia was not without critics. The troops did not intervene as traditional peacekeepers, because that would have required two preconditions: peace to keep and an invitation from a host government. In Somalia, at the time of the intervention both pre-conditions were missing. There was no government and no peace to keep. Consequently ... once a country utterly loses its ability to govern itself, it also loses its claim to sovereignty and should become a ward of the United Nations" [31]. The intervention in Somalia focused on prevention of further starvation and to achieve this it unintentionally or intentionally treated the warlords as legitimate leaders. "Some observers objected that the United Nations ... treated [the warlords] as honored dignitaries [and] ...caved into one power play after another ... A UN official reportedly stated that ... I have never in my 12 years with UN seen it give in to men like this...These are common criminals. It is shameful" [31]. On other related issues, the UN was forced to play the role of police, military and national administrators and peace conferences held by the Somali warring factions which was coordinated by the UN, lacked effective enforcement and political instruments. On the ground meanwhile disarmament was needed, however, both the UN and United States dragged their feet and shy away to shoulder the burden of the task. "The transition was made more difficult because the United Nation ... intentionally dragged their feet in a bid to force the United States to shoulder more of the burden. The United Nations hoped to push the United States into more involvement in disarmament before turning responsibility over to a less well-armed operation" [32].

The United States was a major part of the UN intervention in Somalia and its role in UNITAF has contributed positively. Indeed, over the last two decades,

Somalia had become a nation of endemic civil wars, extreme poverty, piracy save-heaven and headquarters of Islamic militia as well as immense human suffering. For these reasons and others the United States finds itself morally and strategically involved. Conceptually, the US Operation Restore Hope (ORH) in the 1990s is relevant in our discussion. The operation was a milestone in the history of the United States as well as the United Nations. The operation also expanded the role of the US in post Cold War era. Nonetheless, the Somali-US relation has not started with this operation. In late 1970s Somalia had switched over to the West as a client state from the Soviet Union.

Subsequent of this foreign policy shift the regime received large amounts of military and economic aid from the United States. In 1992 President Bush made the ORH possible for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. In fact, President Bush was concerned on the humanitarian adversity and immediately embarked on massive peacekeeping mission in the country. But this was during the last few months as president and although some key advisors within the administration opposed the intervention, the US led the Unified Task Force, or UNITAF took off to save millions of Somali children. The force incorporated US and other troops working together in one task force under US and not under UN direction. The operation had two phases, namely; provide relief and restore hope. However, these two impasses remain up-to-date; a situation which indicates the extent of failure on the part of the international community in the Somali case.

That said, it must not be forgotten that the international community made a vital intervention to save the situation with the determination to succeed. Large number of troops of international force has been deployed in three idiosyncratic stages in a period of three years in the early epoch of Somali crisis; however, the Somali impasse continues to this date. It is agreeable therefore to state that the international community's initiatives worked on temporary humanitarian arrangement but failed to build a long term solution as its political scheme made no major endeavors to meet the Somalia's political needs. Nevertheless, the intervention established secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and put millions of people out of harm. On the other hand, the international community missed vital opportunity of working with surviving local entities. At the same time, the international community could not impede the escalation of the war as its political strategy failed. This was due to mismanagement, misuse of resources as

well as the inability to reinstate public order and bring ethnic strife to an end. However, it is notably imperative to put in record that, the international community can not be blamed for the failures of all its missions since the conflict on the ground has increasingly created challenging circumstances disallowing the international community to set up a dynamic presence on the ground. That said, the international community failed to employ long-term and well mapped futuristic diplomacy on the ground. The reconstruction of the major intuitions in the country should be made the prime concern. Current initiatives including AMISOM must avoid past failures. AMISOM's dilemma which could cause a failure is the international community persists to leave the entire operation in the hands of the African Union both the US and the UK have requested the AU to solely contribute to AMISOM. Meanwhile, the international stakeholders are aware that AMISOM functions under thorny circumstances and with inadequate material and human resources. The current perception on the ground is that, the objective of the international community is to defeat al-Shabaab. At the same time, the international community never set strict key performance indicators (KPI) for the former and current leaders of Transitional Governments.

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